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“ESTABLISHMENT”:  A CORE CONCEPT IN 
CHINESE INBOUND INCOME TAXATION 
Wei Cui* 
Analogous with the concept of a U.S. “trade or 
business” in U.S. federal income tax law, the concept of 
“establishment” under Chinese tax law determines the 
boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation 
of inbound investments.  As central as the concept is, it has 
received surprisingly little interpretation.  
This Article traces the cause of this under-
interpretation to China’s traditional regulatory 
environment for foreign investment that was biased against 
portfolio investments and non-corporate business forms, 
and describes recent regulatory and commercial 
developments that may rekindle interest in elaborating the 
meaning of “establishment.”  It then reviews the 
interpretations that have been given to the concept under 
existing law, as well as several areas of commercial 
practice where additional guidance is urgently needed.  
Finally, the Article examines what policy considerations 
should guide the further development of the concept.  
This policy analysis considers the overall tax policy 
stance toward foreign portfolio investment that may 
reasonably be attributed to China.  The country’s large 
surpluses in current and capital accounts and currency 
reserves make it doubtful that a dramatically more 
favorable model for taxing foreign investment is 
appropriate in the near term.  'onetheless, because tax 
policy plays a subsidiary role to other regulatory policy in 
the treatment of foreign investments, cogent arguments can 
be advanced for adopting an interpretation of 
“establishment” that allows foreign portfolio investment 
already identified as beneficial for China to proceed. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
A basic similarity between the Chinese approach to international 
income taxation and that of many other countries is the two-tiered system 
China uses to tax inbound foreign investments:  some items of income 
earned by foreigners are taxed on a gross-income basis, primarily by way of 
withholding, while others are taxed on a net-income basis, through the 
filing of annual tax returns that account for both income and expenses.  In 
the U.S., as a comparative example, whether an item of income is subject to 
one or the other mode of taxation turns upon whether the foreign recipient 
of income is engaged in a “trade or business” in the U.S. and whether the 
income is “effectively connected” with such U.S. trade or business.1  In 
China, a similar determination for a foreign non-individual taxpayer 
 
 1. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881, 882 (2009).   
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depends on whether the foreign entity’s income is effectively connected 
with an “establishment or site” (“jigouchangsuo,” or “establishment” for 
short) in China.2  
The existence of this point of resemblance between Chinese and 
American inbound income taxation is in itself unsurprising.  There is, after 
all, the income tax treaty concept of “permanent establishment,” which 
determines whether the business profits of an enterprise are taxable on a 
net-income basis in the country where the income arises.3  This suggests 
that most countries adopt some combination of taxation on the basis of net 
and gross income for inbound investments.  However, U.S. tax lawyers 
generally are careful in distinguishing between domestic and treaty law 
concepts.  In the U.S., for example, the “U.S. trade or business”4 concept 
carries most of the weight in determining whether foreigners might be 
taxable on a net-income basis, whereas the “permanent establishment” 
concept performs, for the most part, a secondary function in determining 
how a nonresident would be taxed in the U.S.5  Similarly, it is prudent to 
expect that the “permanent establishment” concept would not capture how 
other countries draw the line between net- and gross-income basis taxation, 
and this determination for a foreign investor in China will rest on the 
interpretation of the domestic Chinese concept of “establishment.”  How 
China has drawn this line in the past, and how it might redraw it in the 
future, is the subject of this Article.6  
The urgent need to clarify the legal definition and application of 
“establishment” in China stems from three sets of recent legal, regulatory 
and commercial developments.  The first is a liberalization of foreign 
investment regulations to permit more foreign business activities to be 
conducted in non-corporate forms, e.g., contractual joint ventures and 
partnerships.7  Because the inflexibilities of China’s law for corporations 
 
 2. Enterprise Income Tax Law (10th Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective 
Jan. 1, 2008), arts. 3(2), 3(3), translated in WORLDLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) 
[hereinafter EIT Law]. 
 3. See Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, arts. 5, 7 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. 2005), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/49/35363840.pdf [hereinafter OECD Model Convention] 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  
 4. I.R.C. § 864(b) (2009). 
 5. See I.R.C. § 894(a) (2009). 
 6. Whether any item of income received by a foreign entity may be taxed on a net-
income basis also depends on whether the income is “effectively connected” with an 
“establishment.”  Thus, strictly speaking, having an “establishment” in China is only a 
necessary and not a sufficient condition for net-income basis taxation to apply.  However, 
the examination of the law and practice of attribution of income to an “establishment” is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
 7. See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text.  
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have long constituted a burden for foreign investors, this regulatory 
relaxation is likely to be met with enthusiasm among investors interested in 
China.8  Moreover, rapid developments in venture capital (VC) and private 
equity (PE), where the use of noncorporate forms prevails even in countries 
with flexible corporate laws, have also generated interest on the part of 
foreign investors in such forms in China.9  Because in China, as elsewhere, 
whether a foreign person is taxed on a net-income or gross-income basis 
generally becomes an issue only when the person has an unincorporated 
business presence,10 exploration of new business forms has raised new 
questions about the line between these two bases of taxation.  
Second, foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in China, as opposed to 
foreign direct investment (FDI), is now viewed more favorably than before, 
and it is starting to play a greater role in China’s capital markets.11  For 
active business operations in a foreign country (typically associated with 
FDI), net-income taxation, borne by either a subsidiary or a branch, is 
generally a given.  It is typically passive investment activities that are 
sensitive to whether net-income or gross-income taxation applies.  For 
example, under China’s new Enterprise Income Tax Law (“EIT Law”) and 
its implementing regulations, the corporate income tax rate is 25%, whereas 
the withholding tax rate on dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, etc., 
is 10%.12  For most portfolio investors, despite the lack of deductions, 
investment income would be subject to a lower Chinese tax rate (further 
reducible under income tax treaties) if it were not treated as received by a 
Chinese establishment.  As experience in the U.S. has shown,13 when FPI 
becomes an important part of a country’s domestic capital markets, 
delineating the boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation 
 
 8. Nancy Marsh et al., Partnerships in China:  The 'ew Frontier, 14(4) IBFD ASIAN 
PAC. TAX BULL. 296, 296 (2008) (discussing the attraction of the partnership form as a way 
of circumventing the corporate form’s limitations on capital structure). 
 9. See, e.g., Alan Tsoi & Pauline Zhang, Venture Capital and Private Equity Funds in 
China, 53 TAX NOTES INT’L 1211 (2009). 
 10. This is because business presence in the form of a corporate subsidiary is generally 
taxed under the regular income tax on a net-income basis.  See infra Section I.A.1.  
 11. See infra Section I.B. 
 12. EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 4(1) (setting the corporate rate at 25%), art. 4(2) 
(setting the maximum withholding tax rate at 20%), art. 37 (providing for withholding on 
Chinese-source income); Enterprise Income Tax Law Implementation Regulations 
(promulgated by the State Council, Decree No. 512, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) art. 
91(1), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter EIT Law IR] 
(reducing the withholding tax rate to 10%). 
 13. See generally Stanford G. Ross, United States Taxation of Aliens and Foreign 
Corporations:  The Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 and Related Developments, 22 TAX 
L. REV 277 (1967); David R. Sicular & Emma Q. Sobol, Selected Current Effectively 
Connected Income Issues for Investment Funds, 56 TAX LAW 719 (2003). 
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also becomes crucial.  
Third, the new EIT Law, effective since 2008, has dramatically 
limited the scope of tax holidays and concessions previously available to 
foreign investments.14  In the absence of these concessions and tax holidays, 
Chinese tax planning for foreign investors will return to more traditional 
methods involving transaction structure, transfer pricing, and the like.  
These require more attention to technical applications of increasingly 
complex rules, in contrast to the previous singular focus of most FDI 
investors on obtaining tax holidays and other preferences.  One of the many 
novel aspects of the EIT Law is that it has both rationalized and increased 
the complexity of the two-tiered structure of inbound taxation.  At the 
center of this structure is the notion of “establishment or site.”  Yet, as this 
Article explains, the notion of “establishment” has not been adequately 
interpreted under Chinese tax law and remains poorly understood by both 
taxpayers and tax authorities.  In light of growing taxpayer sophistication, 
this lack of clarity will become increasingly noticeable.  
This Article offers the first scholarly analysis of the essential 
Chinese tax concept of “establishment” in terms not only of its past and 
current interpretation but also of its likely treatment in the near future.  In 
examining the latter, I will be particularly concerned with the design of 
appropriate tax rules for foreign portfolio investment.  This focus reflects 
my belief that, more than other underlying economic causes for 
unincorporated business presences of foreigners, FPI in China’s capital 
markets will drive the development of the law relating to establishments.15  
The Article will be organized as follows.  In Section I, I describe 
the relatively unique legal, regulatory and commercial contexts in which 
“establishment” applies.  These contextual configurations are important for 
tax practitioners and policymakers to understand because they significantly 
shape how tax issues arise and how the market and governmental 
authorities respond.  In particular, I argue that the intertwining of 
organizational and regulatory law in China traditionally created a serious 
bias against unincorporated forms of foreign investment.  This may be the 
single most important factor that explains the underdevelopment of the 
 
 14. Tax holidays had been granted on the basis of the location and nature of the 
operation of the FIEs.  They often covered at least firms’ initial five profitable years, and 
sometimes lasted even longer.  See generally Jinyan Li, Fundamental Enterprise Income Tax 
Reform in China:  Motivations and Major Changes, 61 BULLETIN FOR INT’L TAXATION 519 
(2007). 
 15. Other underlying causes include natural resource explorations, short-term visits of 
professionals providing technological know-how, and so on.  See ARVID A. SKAAR, 
PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT:  EROSION OF A TAX TREATY PRINCIPLE (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation 1991), at 13–17. 
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concept of “establishment” (compared to the elaboration of the concept’s 
equivalent in other jurisdictions) in the past.  In addition, significant 
barriers to foreign portfolio investment also limit the scope of application of 
“establishment.”  Although restrictions against unincorporated business 
forms and FPI have been significantly relaxed recently, the incremental 
fashion in which this is taking place also explains the slowness with which 
tax authorities have responded.  
Section II turns to government-issued interpretations of the scope 
of “establishment” under Chinese statutes and regulations, as well as the 
areas of foreign investment in which the ambiguities associated with the 
concept have recently become most notable.  While the government’s 
interpretations of “establishment” remain incomplete, important examples 
can be found showing at least an awareness of the special problems posed 
by noncorporate business forms and portfolio investments.  However, this 
awareness has yet to develop into a sustained recognition of an important 
policy issue.  In the meantime, striking inconsistencies exist in the implicit 
approach the government has taken toward the interpretation of 
“establishment.” 
In Section III, I try to advance this area of policy by examining 
some of the choices facing the further development of the notion of 
“establishment.”  The first choice can be formulated as the following 
question:  assuming that foreign portfolio investors favor the exclusion of 
passive investments from the definition of “establishment,” would a 
comprehensive interpretation of “establishment” in this manner be 
appropriate in the near future?  Because China is likely to continue to 
control capital accounts,16 particularly in the face of increasing evidence of 
inflow associated with the expectation of continued appreciation of the 
renminbi (the Chinese currency) and global financial instability generally, 
the answer appears to be “no,” at least for the short term.  Assuming this 
answer to be correct, one may nonetheless raise the question:  how can 
reasonable tax treatments be designed for forms of FPI, e.g., private equity 
investments, that are already identified as beneficial for China?  Using the 
currently-debated issue of the partnership-to-partner attributions of business 
nexus as an illustration, I argue that more specific policy considerations 
must be introduced to make advances in this area.  Such considerations 
include whether a tax rule is aimed at affecting a binary decision by 
investors of investing or not investing, instead of at a marginal decision of 
how much more to invest, as well as whether the rule introduces dissimilar 
treatment of foreign and domestic investors that could easily lead to 
manipulation. 
 
 16. See infra notes 171–184 and accompanying text. 
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While I believe that many of the empirical hypotheses and legal 
interpretations advanced in this Article are novel in some respects, the 
arguments in Section III are explorations in uncharted waters to an even 
greater extent than others.  Especially because of different views about the 
nature of capital inflows and their impact on the Chinese economy,17 it has 
become difficult in the past few years to find coherent articulations of 
China’s overall economic policy toward inbound portfolio investment.  
Even rarer are discussions of what tax policies may be appropriate for the 
coming years.  I believe this is largely attributable to the fact that economic 
and tax policies toward foreign investment fall within the jurisdiction of an 
at once insular and fragmented bureaucratic state, where there are few 
channels for public input and little inter-agency coordination.  The 
bureaucrats in charge generally lack the incentives to confront larger policy 
issues and to process and integrate the information needed to resolve them.  
However, the politics of regulation-making in China is beyond the scope of 
this Article.18  I nevertheless offer a tentative analysis of the considerations 
relevant to current tax policy toward inbound portfolio investment in the 
hope that the analysis (however inchoate) may shed light on where the 
government’s and taxpayers’ interests lie, so that technical discussions of 
treatments of particular transactions may take on a greater sense of purpose. 
I.  LEGAL, REGULATORY AND COMMERCIAL CONTEXT FOR THE CONCEPT 
OF “ESTABLISHMENT” 
Non-tax legal and regulatory factors can sometimes shape tax law 
concepts in powerful ways.  In China, as elsewhere, a locally formed 
corporation is treated as a domestic taxpayer even if owned wholly by 
foreign persons.19  Thus, whether a foreign person is taxed on a net-income 
basis is an issue only when the person has an unincorporated business 
presence in China, and the concept of “establishment” applies only where 
unincorporated business operations are permitted by non-tax law.  A crucial 
piece of background for understanding China’s inbound tax rules is 
therefore that the country’s FDI regulatory regime has traditionally 
displayed a substantial bias against unincorporated business forms.20  This 
Section explores the manifestations and causes of this bias.  It also 
examines a policy preference against foreign portfolio investment—another 
 
 17. See infra notes 173–179 and accompanying text.  
 18. See generally VICTOR SHIH, FACTIONS AND FINANCE IN CHINA (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2008).  
 19. See EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 2.  
 20. See infra Section I.A. 
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factor that in the past has impeded the development of tax rules concerning 
“establishment.”  
Besides providing the background to China’s inbound tax rules, the 
bias in the choice of form in China’s FDI regulation raises an interesting 
question for tax scholars.  In the design of international tax policy, a 
fundamental question is whether tax law should give effect to the legal 
distinctness of corporate subsidiaries.21  In the context of such discussion, it 
seems useful to know whether multinational corporations (MNCs), when 
they choose to invest in other jurisdictions, generally prefer to use corporate 
subsidiaries as opposed to branches.  It is sometimes observed that, in fact, 
MNCs predominantly use the subsidiary form.22  As we will see, while this 
observation also holds true in the context of foreign investment in China, it 
does not reveal anything about MNC preferences since in China, the branch 
form is generally not allowed.23  Indeed, given the rigid capital structure 
requirements for the corporate form, many MNCs investing in China, 
unless they have very substantial operations there, would likely have a 
preference for non-corporate forms.  More generally, there may be other 
countries like China, where a relatively rigid statutory limitation on 
corporate form would have created a preference for the branch form, but the 
branch or other non-corporate form was not available to achieve MNCs’ 
economic goals.  This suggests that the empirical question of what MNCs 
prefer is quite complicated, as it would need to take into account different 
countries’ regulatory hurdles for different business forms. 
A. Historical Bias Against Unincorporated Forms 
While the limited availability of noncorporate business 
organizational forms in China has not gone unnoticed,24 there is no official 
or well-known account of why this is the case.  A plausible hypothesis 
would explain the phenomenon as follows.  The early development of the 
FDI regime focused on corporate forms.25  Because foreign invested 
 
 21. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt 
Formulary Apportionment for Corporate Income Taxation:  The Hamilton Project (Univ. of 
Mich. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 85, 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=995202 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  
 22. See Daniel Shaviro, Does More Sophisticated Mean Better?, 54 TAX L. REV. 353, 
360 (2001). 
 23. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.  
 24. See Xinmiao Tang, Inquiry into the Organizational Forms Available to Foreign 
Invested Enterprises, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DAILY (China), February 22, 2002, at 8 (in 
Mandarin). 
 25. Since the late 1970s, China has erected a legal framework for FDI by adopting a 
series of laws and regulations, among which three statutes have set force the three major 
54 COLUMBIA JOUR'AL OF TAX LAW [Vol. 1:46 
enterprises (FIEs) are heavily regulated in China, with regulatory power 
over them assigned to powerful government agencies early on, the 
corporate forms of FIEs became associated with vested interests of the 
regulatory agencies.26  These vested interests ensured that non-corporate 
forms were neglected in the legislative process and discriminated against in 
practice, since such forms would not enhance, and could even detract from, 
the authority of the agencies. 
The juncture at which corporate law and regulatory interest become 
intertwined can be identified more precisely.  A basic distinction between 
corporate and non-corporate business forms in China is the emphasis on a 
relatively stable capital structure for the corporate form.27  Following a 
continental European model,28 China’s corporations are subject to 
registered capital requirements where both increases and decreases in 
equity capital require cumbersome procedures purported to facilitate 
monitoring by creditors.29  These aspects of the corporate law, aimed at 
protecting creditors against shareholders, coincided with many early FDI 
regulatory concerns, such as that FIEs engaged only in business activities 
for which they were approved, that foreign investors actually contributed 
the capital and technologies that they promised, and that foreign investors 
                                                                                                                 
permitted forms of foreign invested entities.  The earliest of these statutory forms—the 
Chinese-foreign equity joint venture—was required to be corporate in nature.  Although the 
two later forms (the Chinese-foreign cooperative joint venture and the wholly-owned foreign 
enterprise) theoretically allowed non-corporate variations, their legislation was 
contemporaneous with efforts to draft the Company Law, and well preceded the Partnership 
Enterprise Law and other business organizational law.  See, inter alia, the Law on Chinese-
Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
July 1, 1979, effective as amended Mar. 15, 2001), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 
14, 2010) [hereinafter EJV Law]; the Law on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 13, 1988, effective as amended Oct. 31, 
2000), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter CJV Law]; the Law 
on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., April 12, 
1986, effective as amended Oct. 31, 2000), available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200411/20041100311068.html 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (as revised Oct. 31, 2000) (in translation); the Company Law 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective as 
amended Oct. 27, 2005), translated in ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 
Company Law]. 
 26. The most important of these agencies include the Ministry of Commerce and the 
State Development and Reform Commission (and their predecessors), as well as the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce. DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL, 368–409 (2d ed. 2009). 
27See generally Yan Liu, Reflections on the Registered Capital System, 51.31 PEKING U. 
LAW REV. (zhongwai faxue) 34 (1997); Xudong Zhao, From Reliance on Capital to Reliance 
on Assets, 25.5 CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW (faxueyanjiu) 109 (2003). 
 28. See generally Zhao, supra note 27. 
 29. Id. 
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did not financially harm Chinese joint venture partners.30  Therefore, FIE 
regulations tended to accentuate these aspects of the corporate model:  for 
example, changes in capital structure of an FIE must not only be 
accountable to creditors, but also be approved by the government itself.31  
Even as the regulatory concerns gradually lost their relevance when China’s 
economy became more open after the 1990s, government agencies seemed 
reluctant to surrender control.  Enforcing the rigidities of corporate law 
allowed them to continue to wield power over FIEs; it is therefore not 
surprising that these agencies are at best ambivalent about the development 
of new, more flexible business forms.  
This explanation of the regulatory entrenchment of the corporate 
form is consistent with the history of the development of the few non-
corporate business forms available to foreign investors, including the 
representative office, the corporate branch, and the cooperative joint 
venture.   
The most traditional type of unincorporated presence in China is 
the representative office (RO).32  Initially, ROs were the only footholds 
foreign businesses could establish in China’s closed economy.33  They were 
meant to serve no more than liaison functions and were subject to light 
regulatory requirements.  In a very few sectors, ROs were subsequently 
permitted to grow and perform more robust functions.  For example, 
foreign law firms were explicitly authorized to provide certain legal 
services through ROs, and that is how most foreign law firms in China 
operate now.34  But outside these sectors, ROs are prohibited from engaging 
 
 30. See, e.g., EJV Law, supra note 25, at art. 5 (venture partner must warrant quality of 
equipment and technology); Regulations for the Implementation of the Law on Sino-foreign 
Equity Joint Ventures, art. 4 (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 20, 1983, last 
amended July 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/RegulationsonForei
gnInvestment/P020060620322890786346.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (as revised July 
22, 2001) (in translation) (stating that the government should review a joint venture contract 
to ensure that it is not “patently unfair to one party”). 
 31. See Paul, Hastings Shanghai Office, Using a Chinese Entity for an All-foreign Joint 
Venture in China—Does It Make Sense?, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, May 2005, at 28; see also 
generally CHOW, supra note 26, Chapter 10. 
 32. See Interim Provisions on the Administration of Resident Representative Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 30, 1980), translated in 
ASIANLII (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
 33. See OWEN D. NEE, JR., Business Operations in the People’s Republic of China, 
B.N.A. TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 957-3d, A-25 to A-26 (2008). 
 34. In effect, therefore, law firm ROs are like branches, even though they are not 
labeled as such.  Regulation on Administration of Representative Offices of Foreign Law 
Firms (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 22, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-08/24/content_25816.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) 
(in translation). 
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in direct profit-making activities (including investing) and from performing 
other than ancillary functions.35  Instead, profit-making activities must be 
pursued through the heavily regulated FIE forms.36  In reality, the boundary 
between “support functions” and “direct” profit-making activities is vague; 
it is difficult for businesses to avoid and for the government to police.  The 
ROs of many foreign businesses venture into grey areas far from the 
strictest interpretation of the officially sanctioned business scope for ROs.37 
A second type of unincorporated presence is the corporate branch.  
Although China’s Company Law has allowed foreign companies to 
establish branches since 1993, it required the State Council to issue 
regulations for the approval of such branches.38  Relevant regulations have 
been adopted for only a few sectors (including banking).  Thus, the only 
foreign companies that have opened branches in China fall within those few 
sectors.39  Note that in the few sectors in which either ROs are permitted to 
 
 35. A 1995 regulation stated that, for ROs under its jurisdiction, none can engage in 
“direct” profit-making activities.  Instead, they may only pursue “liaison, marketing support, 
information gathering and technology exchanges.”  In other words, an RO generally is not 
allowed to pursue businesses of its own; it can only provide support to the business activities 
of the foreign company of which the RO is legally a part.  Implementing Rules for the 
Examination, Approval and Administration of Resident Representative Offices of Foreign 
Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation, Feb. 13, 
1995), available at http://www.pathtochina.com/chinabiz/2007/12/detailed-rules-of-the-
implementation-of-the-examination-approval-and-administration-of-the-resident-
representative-offices-of-foreign-enterprises-in-china/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (in 
translation). 
 36. In a recent sign of liberalization of foreign investment regulation, the State Council 
has circulated a draft of the revised Administrative Measures for the Registration of 
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises (on file with the author), which states that a 
representative office may engage in profit-making activities to the extent provided by 
treaties or agreements that China has entered into with other countries. 
 37. Indirect evidence for this occurrence is a large number of circulars issued by the 
Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation and local tax agencies on the 
taxation of different types of income of ROs.  See e.g., Cai shui [1985] 110 [Interim 
Provisions Concerning Imposition of Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax and 
Enterprise Income Tax on Resident Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, May 15 1985); Cai shui [1985] 122 [Interpretation 
of Some Policy Matters Regarding the Interim Provisions for the Collection of Consolidated 
Industrial and Commercial Tax and Enterprises Income Tax on Resident Representative 
Offices] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, May 15 1985); Cai shui wai [1985] 197 
[Additional Regulations on the Question Concerning Imposition of Consolidated Industrial 
and Commercial Tax and Enterprise Income Tax on Resident Representative Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and State Admin. of Taxation, 
Sept. 25, 1985). 
 38. Company Law, supra note 25, art. 11.  
 39. See State Council Decree [2006] 478 [Regulations on the Administration of 
Foreign-Invested Banks] (promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 8, 2006) (permitting bank 
branches); State Council Decree [2001] 336 [Regulation on the Administration of Insurance 
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pursue profit-making activities directly or foreign companies are allowed to 
set up branches, specialized agencies—including the Ministry of Justice 
(which regulates the legal profession) and bank and insurance regulators—
are involved, in addition to the agencies generally in charge of foreign 
direct investment.  This may suggest that unincorporated business pursuits 
were made possible in these sectors only because other bureaucratic voices 
superseded the voice of the pro-corporate-form, traditional FDI regulators.   
Yet another story illustrating the same inhospitality toward non-
corporate forms relates to the history of the cooperative joint venture (CJV), 
one of the three traditional forms of FIEs.40  Before the CJV form was 
codified in 1988,41 Chinese and foreign venture partners experimented with 
the form and, in some cases, indicated a preference for a CJV to take the 
“non-legal person” format—in other words, to be merely contractual in 
nature and not limited in liability as a matter of organizational law.42  This 
preference, as well as the use of similar organizational forms in other 
countries, was recognized by the government when the CJV Law was 
drafted.43  However, soon after the FIE regulatory regime established its 
authority over the CJV form, the use of the non-legal person CJV declined, 
reportedly because “government authorities [would] generally no longer 
approve such cooperative enterprises.”44  This was so much the case that 
when the government revived the non-legal person CJV form for 
establishing domestic venture capital funds in 2003 (discussed immediately 
below), even the most experienced legal and tax practitioners in China 
confessed to unfamiliarity with it. 
                                                                                                                 
Companies with Foreign Investment] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 5, 2001) 
(permitting insurance company branches); State Council Decree [1993] 131 [Regulation on 
Sino-Foreign Cooperation in the Exploitation of Continental Petroleum Resources] 
(promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 7, 1993, as amended by State Council Decree 317, 
Sept. 18, 2007) (permitting oil and gas company branches). 
 40. See CJV Law, supra note 25.  
 41. The Law on Chinese-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (promulgated by the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 13, 1988, revised Oct. 31, 2000), available at 
http://www.hecpb.gov.cn/english/news/display.php?id=1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) (in 
translation).  
 42. See Tuobin Deng, Minister of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation, (7th Nat’l 
People’s Cong. Mar. 31, 1988) (discussing the draft of the CJV Law submitted to the Nat’l 
People’s Cong.). 
 43. Id.  
 44. NEE, supra note 33, at A-23 to A-24.  Although the CJV (even in its legal person 
form) is widely perceived to be more flexible than the equity joint venture (EJV), the use of 
CJVs in general lagged behind the use of EJVs, likely due to the regulatory preference over 
the latter. 
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B. Recent Advances in Partnership Forms 
In contrast to the historical bias against unincorporated forms of 
foreign investment, a remarkable surge of interest in such forms has taken 
place in the last few years.  This began with a multi-agency effort to 
promote venture capital investing in China in the early 2000s.45  Foreign 
VC operators were perceived to be crucial providers of expertise in the 
nascent industry, and after a few years of consultation, the government 
understood that foreign fund sponsors would only accept non-corporate 
means of fund formation.46  Because China’s Partnership Enterprise Law 
did not permit foreign or non-individual investors at that time, the 
government turned to the cooperative joint venture for organizing “foreign-
invested venture capital investment enterprises,” permitting the use of non-
legal person CJV for this purpose.47  
More recently, in 2006, China revised its Partnership Enterprise 
Law.48  The revised Partnership Enterprise Law for the first time permits 
foreign investors to become partners in Chinese partnerships and provides a 
statutory framework for limited partnerships.49  No particular government 
agency can be considered the backer or sponsor of the Partnership 
Enterprise Law’s revision.50  Instead, it was moved along by China’s 
legislative elite (including legal academics, but with little participation from 
legal service providers) generally responsible for planning the development 
of China’s statutory framework.51  For this reason, although foreign 
investment in Chinese partnerships is now a statutory possibility, its 
actualization, like the actualization of the possibility of foreign corporate 
branches in China, still faces some uncertainty.  
In particular, according to the Partnership Enterprise Law, foreign-
 
 45. See Jeff Wood & Richard Xu, China’s Revised Venture Capital Rules:  Limited 
Partnerships with Chinese Characteristics?, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, Mar. 2003, at 18.  
 46. Id. 
 47. See Provisions Concerning the Administration of Foreign-Funded Venture 
Investment Enterprises (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. 
Cooperation, Jan. 30, 2003, effective Mar. 1, 2003) available at 
http://english.sohu.com/2004/07/04/78/article220847846.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
 48. The Partnership Enterprise Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 
23, 1997, as amended Aug. 27, 2006) available at 
http://www.buyusa.gov/asianow/partnership.doc (last visited Feb. 14. 2010) [hereinafter 
Partnership Enterprise Law]. 
 49. See Marsh et al., supra note 8; Peng Tao, Is It a Good Time to Form a Chinese 
Partnership Enterprise?, CHINA TAX INTELLIGENCE, Oct. 2007 at 22. 
 50. Interview with Shuguang Li, Professor, China University of Political Science and 
Law, in Beijing, China (Aug. 10, 2006). Professor Li participated in the drafting of the 
Partnership Law. 
 51. Id.  
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invested partnerships (FIPs) can be established only pursuant to further 
regulations issued by the State Council.52  In designing such regulations, 
which have not yet been issued, the State Council faces a dilemma.  On one 
hand, the regulation of FIPs needs to generally conform to regulations 
governing other FIEs:  if the former is significantly more relaxed than the 
latter, then many foreign businesses will abandon the traditional rigid FIE 
forms in favor of the more flexible partnership form.53  This could lead to 
an opening in the FIE control regime with unpredictable consequences.  
“On the other hand, keeping FIPs in parity with traditional FIEs would 
largely deprive FIPs of the attractions of the partnership form, and 
essentially defeat the purpose” of enacting the legislation.54  
However, in discussions preceding the adoption of the revised 
Partnership Enterprise Law, it was clearly understood that the partnership 
form was necessary for venture capital development.55  Indeed, some of the 
strongest interest in the newly available partnership form has come from 
Chinese and foreign financial operators looking to establish onshore, RMB-
denominated funds.56  It is possible that regulations for establishing FIPs 
will be issued specifically for the VC and PE industries, much as 
regulations for establishing branches of foreign corporations were issued 
for select financial industries.57  What is more difficult to predict is whether 
the recent and imminent advances in the use of non-corporate forms (non-
legal person CJVs and partnerships) in the context of investment businesses 
will transform the general bias against unincorporated forms of FDI.  
Because of that bias, foreign companies (outside the few sectors where 
business operations through the RO and branch forms are permitted) have 
in the past been found to have establishments in China for tax purposes 
mostly in connection with the exploration and extraction of natural 
 
 52. Partnership Enterprise Law, supra note 48, art. 108.  
 53. For further discussion of this dilemma and draft FIP regulations circulated in 2007, 
see Wei Cui, China:  Will Partnership Law Be Worth It?, XXVII INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 
2008, at 30–32. 
 54. Id.  
 55. See Ruihua Sun, China’s Venture Capital at a Turning Point, 130 NEW ECON. 
WKLY, April 3, 2007 (in Mandarin), available at 
http://www.daokan.com/ArticleShow.asp?ArticleID=2310&ArticlePage=1 (last visited Feb. 
14, 2010). 
 56. See Rick Carew, China Cheers Private-Equity Home Teams, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 
2007, at C1; Rick Carew, Chinese Private-Equity Fund’s 'ew Role, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 
2007, at C3; Rick Carew, 'ew Private-Equity Fund Targets Deals in China, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 4, 2008, at C3; China Onshore Private Equity Funds (Clifford Chance Client Briefing), 
Nov. 2007 (on file with author).  
 57. See Rick Carew, Buyout Firms Race to Build Yuan Funds to Tap China, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 21, 2009, at C2 (reporting that draft rules governing yuan private-equity funds are in 
the hands of China’s cabinet). 
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resources, construction and installation projects, and other activities of a 
relatively temporary nature.58  The introduction of investment or operating 
partnerships (or partnership-like entities) would create significant new 
challenges for tax rules, as further discussed in Sections II.C and III.B, 
infra.  
C. Increased Foreign Portfolio Investment 
Besides giving impetus to the development of non-corporate 
business forms, foreign investments in Chinese VC and PE funds also 
represent another trend with important implications for inbound taxation.  
Such funds often acquire significant stakes in target companies, and, on 
occasion, provide active financial and management services to the portfolio 
companies.  For this reason, whether investment by a fund should be treated 
as passive investment may be subject to debate.  On the other hand, the 
investments made in these funds by limited partners are more clearly 
characterized as passive investments, and therefore can be regarded as part 
of a broader pattern of increased foreign portfolio investment (FPI) in 
China.  
Traditionally, official Chinese policy discounted the need for FPI.  
Because of the high domestic savings rate and other factors, China was not 
thought to need financial capital per se.59  Instead, the attraction of foreign 
investment was the introduction of technologies and know-how (and until 
recently, the development of China’s export economy), and this could 
happen only through FDI.60  Thus China’s foreign investment regime has 
been heavily biased toward equity as opposed to debt investments.61  Even 
for equity investments, foreigners are encouraged to invest only in certain 
sectors where China’s technological needs are obvious, and are restricted or 
prohibited from investing in disfavored sectors.62  
 
 58. For a discussion of the tax rules in this area, see Joint Oil and Gas Exploitation 
Between Foreign and Chinese Companies (Deloitte World Tax Advisor), Mar. 20, 2009, 
available at http://deloitte.12hna.com/newsletters/2009/WTA/a090320_1.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010). 
 59. See Eswar Prasad & Shang-Jin Wei, The Chinese Approach to Capital Inflows:  
Patterns and Possible Explanations, in CAPITAL CONTROLS AND CAPITAL FLOWS IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES:  POLICIES, PRACTICES AND CONSEQUENCES 421 (Sebastian Edwards 
ed., 2007).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 433; see also Neal Stender et al., Foreign Currency Debt and Conversion 
Controls Tightened for Strong RMB Era, 18 CHINA LAW & PRACTICE 73, 73 (July/Aug. 
2004) (summarizing the basic workings of cross-border borrowing by FIEs in China). 
 62. See generally Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 429; see also, generally, YASHENG 
HUANG, SELLING CHINA–FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA 
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This policy has had two consequences.  One is that is that FPI has 
lagged behind FDI in China in terms of volume.  According to IMF data, by 
2006, the stock of FPI into China was worth only a little over $200 billion, 
much less than the official FDI stock of $742 billion.63  In comparison, the 
U.S. attracted slightly more equity FPI than FDI in 2007; the volume of 
each exceeded $2 trillion.64  The other consequence is that while the total 
amount of China-bound FPI is still significant, most such investments have 
taken place offshore, as Chinese companies listed their stock and debt 
securities in foreign exchanges in Hong Kong, the U.S., etc.65  Given their 
offshore nature, very few of these investments contributed to the 
development of domestic capital markets.  
More recently, the Chinese government has come to view FPI more 
favorably, precisely because of its potential benefit for China’s onshore 
markets.66  For example, there has been a shortage on China’s stock market 
of experienced institutional investors with long-term investment 
objectives;67 so in 2002, the domestic stock and bond markets were opened 
in a limited fashion to qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs).68  In 
2006 the QFII regime was further liberalized.69  Similarly, in the field of PE 
                                                                                                                 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (arguing that the above policy was not in fact effective, that 
what passed as FDI was in many cases financial investment, and that this occurred because 
Chinese domestic enterprises, faced with a dysfunctional domestic financial service sector, 
obtained foreign financing under the pretension of seeking technological know-how). 
 63. See International Monetary Fund, Portfolio Investment:  Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2010) [hereinafter CPIS]; State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, China’s International 
Investment Position 2007 (in Mandarin), http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-
06/21/content_1023491.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter SAFE]. 
 64. See CPIS, supra note 63; SAFE, supra note 63; Elena L. Nguyen, International 
Investment Position of the United States at Year-End 2007, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Survey of Current Business Online, July 2008, at 9, available at 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2008/07%20July/0708_iip.pdf (last visited Feb. 14. 2010). 
 65. See International Monetary Fund, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide 
(2001), at 11-12 (IMF data collection attempts to identify residence of issuer regardless of 
place of listing); ALICE DE JONGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHINA’S H-SHARE 
MARKET 56 (Edward Elgar 2008) (“By December 2003, a total of 93 Chinese companies had 
issued shares outside of China, raising 27.1 billion US dollars in total.”  This number should 
also have risen substantially by 2006.).  
 66. See Andrew McGinty & Andrew Godwin, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle:  'ew 
QFII Rules Open a Share Market, CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE, Dec. 2002 at 10. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id.  Before 2002, foreigners were allowed to trade Chinese stock in the 
domestic exchanges only among themselves, in a separate market from where domestic 
investors traded.  See also STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA’S STOCKMARKET 50–55 (Profile Books, 
The Economist Series 2003).  
 69. See Taylor Hui & Vivien Teu, China QFII Rules Revised—Significant 
Developments for Foreign Fund Managers, CHINA LAW AND PRACTICE, Nov. 2006 at 9.  
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and VC investing, it is thought that foreign institutions and professionals 
operating in such asset classes possess important expertise in evaluating and 
improving business performance and governance, and their participation is 
needed if the field is to develop quickly.70  The latest signs of this policy 
orientation include the Ministry of Commerce’s decision in March 2009 to 
delegate the authority to approve new foreign-invested venture capital 
enterprises with total capital not exceeding $100 million71 to provincial 
authorities, which are generally regarded as more eager to promote foreign 
investments then national agencies.72  
Not surprisingly, because China’s inbound taxation has 
traditionally focused on FDI (as has the rest of the regulatory system), its 
operation has faltered as FPI in China expands.  For example, at the onset 
of the QFII regime, it was immediately unclear how withholding taxes 
would apply to income received by QFIIs.73  Should the tax exemption then 
granted for repatriation of profits on FDI apply to dividends paid on stock 
held by QFIIs as well?  Should the tax on capital gain applicable to the sale 
of FDI investments also apply to gain on the trading of stock where no 
suitable withholding mechanisms have been put in place?  If China were to 
tax QFII income, how would it administer the granting of treaty benefits?  
Until quite recently,74 in the absence of explicit guidance, QFIIs (and their 
customers on behalf of whom QFIIs invested and traded in China) did not 
have to pay Chinese income tax on many types of investment income 
without knowing whether there was any legal basis for this de facto 
exemption or how long it would last.75  We will see further below that other 
forms of FPI in China, for example, real estate investments,76 have 
generated their share of long-standing questions about appropriate tax 
treatments.  While, unlike the onshore investment fund and QFII areas, 
there has been no significant liberalization in recent years in these other 
areas of FPI, if any momentum gathers for clarifying the tax treatment of 
 
 70. See, e.g., Yan Zhou, Blackstone Sets Up 'ew Private Equity Fund in Pudong, 
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-
08/18/content_8581500.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  
 71. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 72. See Shang zi han [2009] 9 [Notice Regarding the Approval of Foreign-Invested 
Venture Capital Enterprises and Venture Capital Management Enterprises] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 5, 2009); O’Melveny & Myers, China Law and Policy 
'ewsflash:  Deregulation of Foreign-invested RMB Funds and Managers of Private Equity, 
Mar. 17, 2009 (on file with author). 
 73. See Kehong Wu, QFII Investments in Chinese Stock–A Feast of Tax Exemptions? 
(in Mandarin), 2 INT’L TAXATION IN CHINA (shewai shuiwu) 73, 73–76 (2008).  
 74. See infra notes 144–49 and accompanying text.  
 75. See Kehong, supra note 73, at 74–75. 
 76. For a discussion of foreign real estate ownership, see infra notes 109-115 and 
accompanying text.  
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onshore funds and QFIIs, there may be implications for the whole range of 
FPI as well.  
II.  STATUTORY CONCEPT OF “ESTABLISHMENT,” ITS EVOLUTION AND 
IMPORTANCE 
Before I examine the existing interpretations of “establishment,” an 
explanation is in order regarding the statutory framework within which the 
concept has its place.  China’s enterprise income tax and the individual 
income tax (IIT) currently fall under two separate statutory regimes, and 
“establishment,” a concept employed by the EIT Law, does not apply for 
IIT purposes.77  In fact, not only is the concept inapplicable in connection 
with individual taxpayers, but the current structure of the IIT also renders 
the distinction between net- and gross-income taxation relatively 
unimportant for foreign individuals.  Under China’s Individual Income Tax 
Law and underlying regulations,78 individuals are effectively classified as 
residents and nonresidents on the basis of domicile and physical presence in 
China,79 with residents being subject to taxation on worldwide income.80  
Non-residents generally are not required to file income tax returns.81  Their 
income from labor services performed in China, if not exempt under 
domestic or treaty law,82 is taxed by way of withholding, and they are taxed 
on other income at flat rates, also via withholding, regardless of nexus to 
China.83  Moreover, the IIT allows few deductions and credits, and 
 
 77. The concept does not appear under the Individual Income Tax Law (promulgated 
by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, as last amended on Dec. 29, 2007), translated in 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter IIT Law] or its regulations 
(Regulations on the Implementation of Individual Income Tax (promulgated by the State 
Council, Feb.18, 2008, effective Jan. 28, 1994), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter IIT Law IR]. 
 78. See IIT Law, supra note 77; IIT Law IR, supra note 77. 
 79. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 1; IIT Law IR, supra note 77, arts. 2, 3 and 6.  
 80. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 1.  
 81. See Guo shui fa [2006] 162 [Circular of the State Administration of Taxation 
Concerning Printing and Distributing the Measures for the Self-Declaration of Individual 
Income Tax] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce for Trial Implementation, Nov. 6, 
2006) art. 4; see generally Wei Cui, China’s 'ew Personal Income Tax Return-Filing 
Regime, 45 TAX NOTES INT’L 977 (2007).  
 82. Domestic law, following the treatment of dependent services in income tax treaties, 
exempts compensation received by any nonresident individual who (1) is present in China 
for less than 90 days during the year, and (2) receives payment from a foreign employer, (3) 
the cost of which payment is not borne by a Chinese “establishment” of the employer.  IIT 
Law IR, supra note 77, art. 7.  Actual income tax treaties usually extend the length of the 
period in (1) to 183 days. 
 83. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 3; IIT Law IR, supra note 77, arts. 4 and 5.  
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essentially only labor service income is taxed at progressive rates.84  The 
only category of income received by an individual that is subject to genuine 
net-income taxation is self-employment income.85  However, foreign 
individuals are largely precluded by non-tax regulatory law from engaging 
in activities that would generate such income.86 
This might seem to limit the significance of the “establishment” 
concept for Chinese inbound taxation, but a fundamental feature of the EIT 
Law implies otherwise.  The EIT Law treats all foreign entities in the same 
way, as though they are corporations.87  No foreign pass-through entities are 
recognized even though domestically, the pass-through concept applies to 
partnerships and certain other entities.88  Thus, foreign partnerships, trusts, 
etc., investing in China would all be subject to the test of whether they have 
a Chinese establishment.  In addition, for regulatory reasons, outside the 
context of investments in real estate, foreign individuals rarely invest 
directly into China (whether the nature of the investment is FDI or FPI), 
and almost always use intermediate entities.89  As a result, despite its 
absence from the IIT rules, the notion of “establishment” is relevant to 
foreign individual investors in China as well. 
 
 84. See Li Jinyan, China’s Individual Income Tax:  A 26-Year-Old Infant, 43 TAX 
NOTES INT’L 297, 297 (2006).  
 85. IIT Law, supra note 77, art. 6.  
 86. See General Principles of the Civil Law (promulgated by the 6th Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) art. 26, translated in LAWINFOCHINA 
(generally, only citizens are permitted to register as “individual industrial and commercial 
households,” i.e., sole proprietorships); see also Regulations on Individual Industrial and 
Commercial Households art. 2 (State Council draft regulation circulated for public comment, 
July 2009), available at 
http://yijian.chinalaw.gov.cn/lismsPro/law_download/fulltext/1248161068168.doc (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2010).  
 87. Article 1of the EIT Law defines enterprises subject to the enterprise income tax as 
all organizations receiving income.  Only specific types of entities formed in China (i.e., 
partnerships and single-individual-owner companies) are excluded from the definition.  See 
EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 2.  
 88. See generally Wei Cui, The Prospect of 'ew Partnership Taxation in China, 46 
TAX NOTES INT’L 625 (2007) [hereinafter Prospect of 'ew Partnership Taxation]. 
 89. Telephone Interview and written correspondence with both Lawrence Sussman, 
Partner, O’Melveny & Myers and Shaolin Luo, Partner, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, in 
Beijing, China (Nov. 23, 2009) (written correspondence on file with author). 
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A. Statutory and Quasi-Statutory Definitions
90
 
Ever since the first tax statute applicable to foreign and foreign-
invested companies was enacted in 1981,91 Chinese tax law has used the 
concept of “establishment.”  Under that statute—the Foreign Enterprise 
Income Tax Law—income derived from a Chinese “establishment” was 
taxed, after appropriate deductions, at graduated rates (with the top rate at 
40%),92 whereas in the absence of an establishment, a foreign company 
would be taxed at a flat 20% rate on the gross amount of any dividends, 
interest, rent, royalties and other income from sources within China.93  
Neither the law nor its implementing rules contained a concept that 
characterized income as “effectively connected” with an “establishment.”94  
Therefore, at least on paper, the 1981 law is consistent with a “force of 
attraction” regime:  as long as an “establishment” exists, all Chinese-source 
income would be subject to net-basis taxation.  It is unclear whether the law 
was interpreted and enforced in this way, although the answer is likely to be 
no.95 
Under the Foreign Invested Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise 
Income Tax Law of 1991, the consequences of having an “establishment” 
in China were reformulated.  Income effectively connected with the 
“establishment” would still be taxed on a net-income basis, but Chinese-
source income not effectively connected with an “establishment” was only 
 
 90. Within the Chinese legal system, material statutory terms and provisions are often 
left to be defined and elaborated by the State Council instead of by the national legislature, 
and the State Council is often the de facto ultimate decisionmaker in tax lawmaking.  Thus, 
the discussion here treats implementation regulations issued by the State Council as quasi-
statutory.  
 91. Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 13, 1981, effective Jan. 1, 1982), translated in ASIANLII (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1981 FEITL], replaced by Income Tax Law on Enterprises with 
Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., April 9, 1991, effective July 1, 1991), translated in ASIANLII (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1991 FEITL]. 
 92. 1981 FEITL, supra note 91, arts. 1-3.  
 93. Id. art. 11.  
 94. See Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for Foreign Enterprises 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Finance, Feb. 21, 1982), translated in ASIANLII (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1982 FEITL IR].  
 95. Foreign taxpayers still face fragmented tax administration in China:  presence or 
activities in a particular locality could trigger tax return filing and other compliance 
obligations enforced by the tax authorities in that particular locality, without regard to the 
taxpayer’s other activities elsewhere.  Therefore, a local tax bureau may not regard itself as 
having the authority to tax a foreign company, which has an “establishment” within its 
jurisdiction, on other income received elsewhere.  
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subject to withholding tax on the gross amount.96  Moreover, the definition 
of “establishment” itself was further developed.  For example, according to 
the 1981 FEITL, a “business agent” could constitute an establishment,97 but 
no definition was provided for the term.  By contrast, the regulations 
implementing the 1991 FEITL explicitly defined business agent, albeit 
narrowly focusing on trade-related agency activities.98  (As discussed 
below, this narrow definition of a business agent allowed for a significant 
2003 ruling in favor of foreign taxpayers in the VC fund context.)  
Similarly, the non-agency, physical presence type of “establishment” was 
redefined to include a larger variety of physical business presences.99 
The 2007 EIT Law and its implementing regulations (which 
together constitute what I call the “new EIT regime”) introduced what are 
perhaps the most significant changes to the definition of “establishment” to 
date.  First, with respect to the agency type of establishment, the new law 
would find such an “establishment” where “a nonresident enterprise 
entrusts an agent to engage in production or trade, including signing 
contracts or storing and delivering commodities on behalf of the [principal] 
on a regular basis.”100  This is a broader definition of “business agents” than 
under previous law, most fundamentally because it is tied to the agent’s 
actions in production or trade (shengchan jingying), which potentially could 
be interpreted to cover many activities 101.  In similar fashion, the new law 
no longer defines the physical presence type of “establishment” merely by 
enumerating examples.  Instead, it provides a catch-all category, “other 
 
 96. 1991 FEITL, supra note 91, art. 19.  Although the statutory language states only 
that Chinese-source income effectively connected with an “establishment” would be subject 
to net-income taxation, subsequent regulations defined Chinese-source income as including 
any income, even if arising outside China, that is effectively connected with a Chinese 
establishment.  See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises (promulgated by the State 
Council, June 30, 1991, effective July 1, 1991) art. 6., translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2010) [hereinafter 1991 FEITL IR].  This is based on an erroneous 
understanding of the function of source rules, and has been corrected by the EIT Law and 
the EIT Law IR.  
 97. 1982 FEITL IR, supra note 94, art. 2(1). 
 98. A business agent was defined as a person “engaged in business as an agent for the 
principal and (1) regularly representing the principal in sourcing and purchasing, as well as 
in signing purchase contracts and buying goods on the principal’s behalf; (2) entering into an 
agency agreement or contract with the principal, regularly storing products or goods owned 
by the principal and delivering these products or goods to other parties on the principal’s 
behalf; or (3) being awarded the authority to regularly represent the principal in signing sales 
contracts and in accepting purchase orders.”  1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 4. 
 99. Id. art. 3.  
 100. EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 5. 
 101. See id. 
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establishments engaged in production or trade.”102  The category of physical 
establishments is thus also open-ended, and the main criterion for 
determining its scope is whether there is engagement in “production or 
trade.”103  
How, then, is the term “production or trade” to be understood?  The 
answer is that although the term has been employed in the definition of 
“establishment” from the beginning,104 it has never been defined in statutes, 
administrative regulations, or agency rulings.  
The closest that the law has come to defining the term is the 
following.  Regulations under both the 1981 FEITL and the 1991 FEITL 
distinguished between two types of income:  “income from production or 
trade” and “other income.”  Whereas “income from production or trade” 
was defined, circularly, by enumeration of various industries and trades and 
then a catch-all category of “other income from production or trade,”105 
“other income” was defined as “dividend, interest, income from rental or 
transfer of property, royalties and income from transfer of patents and 
intellectual property rights, as well as income not derived from the carrying 
on of a trade.”106  It would appear logical to infer from the distinction 
between these two types of income that the mere holding or disposition of 
stock, debt, tangible property, and intellectual property, which does not 
generate “income from production or trade” but only “other income,” 
would not constitute “production or trade.”  This inference will be 
particularly tempting for those familiar with the practice in the U.S. (and 
similar practices in OECD countries) of distinguishing between mere 
investments and the carrying on of a “trade or business.”107  
However, the validity of this inference in the Chinese context is 
doubtful, not because of any contrary interpretation of the term “production 
or trade” but for an opposite and striking reason:  no known official 
pronouncement has ever relied on the distinction between “income from 
production or trade” and “other income.”  Indeed, perhaps precisely 
because of a perceived lack of relevance of the distinction, it has been 
eliminated in the new EIT Law and the regulations that have been issued so 
far.  This is, of course, rather ironic, since the new EIT regime has given the 
government greater latitude in interpreting the meaning of both the physical 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. 1982 FEITL IR, supra note 94, art. 2. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. art. 4; 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 2.  
 107. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941); Chang Hsiao Liang v. 
Comm’r, 23 T.C. 1040 (1955); see also Ross, supra note 13, at 295, for a discussion of 
OECD practice.  
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presence and agency types of establishment,108 and the only articulated 
criterion for such interpretation is whether there is engagement in 
“production or trade.”  
Against this background of interpretive vacuum, two administrative 
announcements stand out in that they have directly delineated the scope of 
“establishment.”  I will examine these now, and consider to what extent 
they shed light on “production or trade.”   
B. Administrative Announcements 
In 1996, the State Administration of Taxation (SAT) issued a 
circular regarding rental income received by foreign enterprises. 109  It states 
that if a foreign enterprise owns and rents out a house, building or other real 
property in China, but has not set up an “establishment or site” to carry out 
routine management of the property, it is subject to income tax on the rental 
income it receives on a gross income basis at the withholding tax rate.110  If 
the foreign enterprise entrusts an agent to manage the real property in 
question (and if, where a relevant income tax treaty applies, the agent is not 
an independent agent), then the foreign enterprise should be treated as 
having an “establishment” in China and subject to tax on a net income 
basis.111  
The background of this circular is unclear, but its aim was probably 
to ensure some type of income tax collection on real estate rent received by 
foreigners, without particular emphasis on differential treatment between 
income derived from an “establishment” and income in the absence of an 
establishment.  For example, in its instructions on the implementation of the 
circular, the Beijing State Tax Bureau explicitly stated that, for rental 
income treated as effectively connected with an “establishment” under the 
SAT circular, a deemed profit of 30% should be used in computing tax 
liability.112  Had the 33% enterprise income tax rate been applied, the 
resulting 9.9% tax burden would be close to the 10% withholding tax rate 
on income not effectively connected with an establishment.113  Tax bureaus 
 
 108. See supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text. 
 109. Guo shui fa [1996] 212 [Notice Regarding Taxing Rental Income of Foreign 
Enterprises from Real Property within China] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation, 
Nov. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Guo shui fa [1996] 212]. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Jing guo shui [1997] 27 [Notice Regarding the Taxation of Rental Income of 
Foreign Enterprises by Renting Out Buildings in China] (promulgated by the Beijing State 
Tax Bureau, Jan. 27, 1997). 
 113. See Guo fa [2000] 37 [Notice Regarding Reduced Taxation of Interest and Other 
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in Shanghai allowed a similar approach and also provided for a deemed 
profit of 30%.114  This suggests that the distinction made in the SAT 
circular was merely theoretical and did not have the intention of either 
encouraging foreign investment in real estate or securing greater revenue 
for the government.115  
Nonetheless, the text of the circular suggests, at least in the real 
estate context, the distinction between merely holding an asset and 
operating or using that asset.116  This resonates with a well-established body 
of U.S. law, going back to at least the 1940s, providing that mere real estate 
holding without servicing and maintaining the property does not give rise to 
a U.S. trade or business.117  Conversely, under U.S. law, if a nonresident 
engages an agent to actively manage real property in the U.S., then the 
nonresident generally would be treated as engaging in a U.S. trade or 
business.118  The 1996 SAT circular seems to have provided an extremely 
condensed version of this doctrine, and it is consistent with the earlier tax 
regulations characterizing rental income as other than “income from 
production or trade.”119  
A second administrative announcement on the scope of 
“establishment” came in 2003120 and was associated with a well-known 
government effort to promote venture capital investments in China.121  At 
the start of 2003, several government ministries jointly issued regulations 
                                                                                                                 
Income from China Derived by Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council, 
Nov. 18, 2000).  
 114. Hu shui wai [1997] 90 [Notice Regarding the Taxation of Rental Income of 
Foreign Enterprises by Renting Out Buildings in China] (promulgated by the Shanghai State 
and Local Tax Bureaus, July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Hu shui wai [1997] 90].  
 115. By contrast, in most of the early U.S. cases in which taxpayers and the government 
disputed whether real estate investment in the U.S. constituted a U.S. trade or business, 
important differences in tax liability existed (e.g., taxpayers sought to claim large 
deductions).  See, e.g., Lewenhaupt v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 151, 162 (1953), aff’d, 221 F.2d 227 
(9th Cir. 1955).  
 116. Guo shui fa [1996] 212, supra note 109. 
 117. See, e.g., Neill v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 197 (1942); De Amodio v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 
894 (1960). 
 118. De Amodio, 34 T.C. at 904–905 (citing Lewenhaupt v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 151 
(1953)). 
 119. See Hu shui wai [1997] 90, supra note 114 (Shanghai tax authorities held further 
that “routine management” of real property involved the capacity to sign rental agreements, 
collect rent, to improve, repair and decorate the property, and “other substantive 
management activities,” but the mere hiring of persons to clean, guard, or perform daily 
maintenance of the property is not sufficient). 
 120. Guo shui fa [2003] 61 [Notice Regarding the Payment of Enterprise Income Tax by 
Foreign Invested Venture Capital Companies] (promulgated by the State Admin. of 
Taxation, June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Guo shui fa [2003] 61]. 
 121. See supra Section I.B. 
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on the formation of foreign-invested venture capital investment enterprises 
(FIVCIEs); a few months later, the SAT issued clarifications as to how such 
enterprises would be taxed.122  According to the SAT pronouncement (the 
2003 VC Tax Rules),123 if a FIVCIE takes a “legal person” form (i.e., its 
investors have limited liability), then it is taxed as a Chinese corporation.124  
If, on the other hand, it takes the “non-legal person” form (i.e., some 
investors bear unlimited liability), then the enterprise and its investors have 
a choice of computing their tax liabilities either at the enterprise or the 
investor level, but are not taxed at both levels.125 
How, though, should the foreign investors be taxed if they 
determine their tax liabilities separately?  Should they be treated as having 
an “establishment” and taxed on a net-income basis, or should they be 
subject only to gross-income taxation?  The 2003 VC Tax Rules provide 
that, generally, investors in non-legal person FIVCIE should be treated as 
having establishments within China and be taxed accordingly.126  However, 
if the FIVCIE does not have its own management office, and does not 
directly manage and advise its investments, but instead contracts with a 
separate management entity to conduct all of its daily affairs and manage its 
investments, then investors would not be treated as having an 
“establishment” in China by virtue of investing in the FIVCIE.127 
While the circular contains no explicit argument for the conclusion, 
the underlying reasoning appears to be the following.  As previously 
discussed, in general, a foreigner’s “establishment or site” in China can take 
the form either of a physical presence (e.g., a business office) or a business 
agent.  Under Chinese commercial law, the investors in a non-legal person 
VC fund own the assets and rights of the business and are principals of its 
agents.128  Therefore, any business office or agent of the fund itself would 
be deemed, for non-tax purposes, to be the office or agent of the fund’s 
investors.  In the scenario described in the 2003 VC Tax Rules in which 
foreign investors are treated as not having an establishment, tax authorities 
 
 122. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See also 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 7 (stating that participants in a “non-
legal person” cooperative joint venture may elect to pay EIT separately, in lieu of the joint 
venture itself). 
 126. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Implementation Rules on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures, arts. 50 and 
52 (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Econ. Coop., Aug. 7, 1995, effective 
Aug. 7, 1995), available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/RegulationsonForei
gnInvestment/t20060620_51088.jsp (in translation) (last visited Feb. 14, 2010).  
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seem to have assumed that the fund does not have its own business office in 
China.  (Whether the office of the external manager should be attributed to 
the fund was not considered.)129  In addition, even if the external manager is 
an agent of the fund and its investors, there is no agency establishment.  
This is because under the tax law then in effect, only business agents 
engaged in the trading of goods were deemed to give rise to 
“establishments” for tax purposes.130  
Unlike the 1996 SAT circular on foreign ownership of real estate, 
the 2003 VC Tax Rules had a genuinely positive effect, in that they enabled 
foreign investors to operate VC funds in China without the fear of being 
subject to net-income basis taxation.131  Virtually all FIVCIEs formed until 
recently (before the revised Partnership Enterprise Law took effect) used 
the management company structure endorsed by the 2003 VC Tax Rules.  
However, as the foregoing analysis shows, the SAT’s position is technically 
based not on characterizing VC investing as a type of investment activity, 
and thus as different from “production or trade.”  Instead, it is based on a 
narrow definition of “business agents”—a situation that the new EIT regime 
has already changed.  Under that new regime, the questions can now be 
raised:  Why isn’t the external manager a business agent of the fund and its 
investors?  If it is, why don’t the foreign investors have a business agent 
“establishment” through the manager?  
Taken together, the 1996 real estate circular and the 2003 VC Tax 
Rules demonstrate that the government has yet to confront the distinct tax 
issues raised by the developments in business forms described in Section I.  
These issues include basic items such as recognition of what is at stake in 
distinguishing net-income and gross-income taxation, as well as specialized 
items such as understanding the proper treatment of partnership and 
partnership-like forms.  And most centrally, both rulings arose in the 
context of FPI, where a crucial issue is whether investment activities should 
be included in the scope of “production or trade” and therefore of 
“establishment.”132  The 2003 VC Tax Rules skirted that crucial issue, 
whereas the earlier ruling only apparently addressed it (without embracing 
its full consequences).  
 
 129. I.R.C. § 864(c)(5) (2009) (attributing the fixed place of business of a non-
independent agent to a foreign person).  
 130. See supra note 98.  
 131. Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120. 
 132. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
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C. 'ew Uncertainties 
Several recent developments in Chinese tax administration 
highlight both the urgent need for the immediate clarification of the scope 
of “establishment” and how, in the absence of sustained policy focus on the 
matter, parties can take widely divergent and inconsistent approaches to 
taxing foreign investment.133  To begin, the 2003 VC Tax Rules134 appear to 
have been made obsolete—ironic in light of the already paltry amount of 
guidance available regarding fund formation.135  This is presumably due to 
the fact that the legal basis of those rules—the Implementation Regulations 
for the Foreign Invested Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax Law 
of 1991—was replaced by the EIT Law on January 1, 2008.136  Strictly 
speaking, therefore, there is no longer any valid legal guidance regarding 
the tax treatment of foreign invested venture capital investment 
enterprises.137  However, because other central government ministries have 
issued several circulars in favor of the operation of FIVCIEs,138 market 
participants appear to assume that it is not the government’s intention to 
adopt radically new and unfavorable tax rules for FIVCIEs, and new funds 
of this type continue to be formed.139  While the 2003 VC Tax Rules can no 
longer be shown to local tax authorities as binding on the treatment of 
FIVCIEs, they are still presented as a reasonable way of taxing such entities 
in the absence of further guidance.140  
 
 133. I am grateful to Lawrence Sussman and Min Huang at the Beijing office of 
O’Melveny & Myers for discussion of the developments reported in this Section. 
 134. See Guo shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120. 
 135. There has been no formal announcement of revocation of the circular.  Instead, it is 
shown as “void in whole” on the website of the State Administration of Taxation.  State 
Admin. of Taxation, 
http://202.108.90.178/guoshui/action/GetArticleView1.do?id=3716&flag=1 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010). 
 136. See 1991 FEITL IR, supra note 96, art. 7 (stating that non-legal person cooperative 
joint ventures may be exempt from entity level taxation).  There is no similar provision 
under the EIT Law or EIT Law Implementation Regulations. 
 137. Some have gone so far as to suggest that such enterprises are no longer exempt 
from entity-level taxation.  See Kevin Wang, Foreign Investors in RMB Funds May Face 
Double Taxation, 49 TAX NOTES INT’L 742, 742–43 (2008).  As discussed in the ensuing 
text, the market has discounted the suggestion of such a radical change in policy. 
 138. See supra note 71 for deregulatory actions taken by the Ministry of Commerce; see 
also Huizongfu [2008] 125 [Replies to Questions Regarding the Application of Foreign 
Exchange for Domestic Equity Investments by Foreign Invested Venture Capital Investment 
Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Nov. 14, 2008) 
(facilitating foreign exchange conversion for FIVCIE investment activities). 
 139. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Sussman, Managing Partner, O’Melveny & 
Myers LLP, in Beijing, China (Nov. 23, 2009). 
 140. Id.  
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Needless to say, this state of affairs presents a significant legal risk 
to investors in FIVCIEs, if only because there is no legal impediment to the 
government reversing the treatment in the 2003 VC Tax Rules.  But just as 
importantly, as discussed above,141 the underlying reasoning in that 
regulation is in tension with the expansion of the scope of “business agent” 
type of “establishment” under the EIT Law Implementation Regulations.  
Thus, even if the 2003 VC Tax Rules had not been made obsolete, there 
would have been a question of how it could be reconciled with the new EIT 
regime.  Another source of concern is that foreign invested partnerships are 
widely regarded as a competing business form for the formation of RMB 
funds that will be available soon,142 whereas the 2003 VC Tax Rules, by 
their terms, do not apply to partnerships.143  The adoption of new tax rules 
for foreign invested partnerships could trigger new scrutiny of the rationale 
underlying the 2003 VC Tax Rules.  In that scenario, taxpayers and their 
advisors may be called upon to freshly defend, for example, why holding an 
equity interest in a partnership or a partnership-like entity in China (which 
has assets and activities in China) should not constitute an “establishment” 
in China.  As we will see in Section III below, such a defense involves 
complex policy considerations and is not easy to carry out.  
Aggravating this legal uncertainty in the fund formation area is the 
manner in which Chinese tax authorities have approached other related 
areas of foreign investment seemingly without awareness of the importance 
of the “establishment” concept, promulgating rules that imply contradictory 
positions.  Two regulations that have recently attracted practitioners’ 
attention illustrate this point.  The first is a circular issued by the SAT 
(State Administration of Taxation) at the beginning of 2009 that initiated 
the practice of withholding income tax paid to QFIIs (qualified foreign 
institutional investors) by companies with stock or bonds listed on the 
Chinese securities markets.144  This regulation (Circular 47) brought an end 
to the previous status quo whereby QFIIs were not subject to any 
withholding tax at all (even though there appeared to be no legal basis for 
such an exemption).145  A potential silver lining in Circular 47, however, is 
 
 141. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 48–57 and accompanying text.  
 143. The 2003 VC Tax Rules apply only to entities formed under the Provisions 
Concerning the Administration of Foreign-Funded Venture Investment Enterprises.  See Guo 
shui fa [2003] 61, supra note 120; Provisions Concerning the Administration of Foreign-
Funded Venture Investment Enterprises, supra note 47. 
 144. Guo shui han [2009] 47 [Notice Regarding the Withholding of Enterprise Income 
Tax with Respect to Dividends and Interest Paid to QFII by Chinese Resident Enterprises] 
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation, Jan. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Guo shui han 
[2009] 47]. 
 145. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text; see also Jinji Wei, A View on 
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that it could be read as resolving an issue regarding “establishment” for 
QFIIs.  As discussed in Section II.A, under the EIT Law Implementation 
Regulations, a foreign entity may be deemed to have an “establishment” in 
China by operating through a business agent, even one that is independent 
in nature.146  Under this regulatory language, the QFIIs—foreign mutual 
funds, insurance companies, and other asset management companies—may 
all theoretically be deemed to have establishments in China via their 
onshore custodians and trading agents.  Although this issue may be 
mitigated for QFIIs that are eligible for treaty benefits (as treaties generally 
provide that the conduct of business through independent agents does not 
give rise to permanent establishments),147 not all QFIIs (or all customers 
that have accounts with QFIIs) are formed in treaty jurisdictions.  
Therefore, the question whether such foreign investors could be deemed to 
have “establishment” in China may remain unanswered.  
Circular 47, by providing for the imposition of withholding tax on 
QFIIs, could be read as conclusively addressing this issue:  since all QFIIs, 
regardless of whether they can claim the benefits of tax treaties,148 are 
treated as subject to the withholding tax and not net-income basis tax, it 
could be inferred that no QFII is deemed to have an “establishment” in 
China through actions by independent agents alone.149  This reading of 
Circular 47, however, is contradicted by another regulation the SAT issued 
during the same week.  In this latter, widely discussed regulation (Decree 
19),150 the SAT requires all nonresident enterprises that provide labor 
services151 in China to (1) register for tax purposes shortly after entering 
                                                                                                                 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in China, 56 TAX NOTES INT’L 275, 277 (2009).  
The regulation remains silent, however, on whether and how capital gain realized by QFIIs 
is to be taxed, thus leaving a large vacuum in this area.  
 146. See EIT Law IR, supra note 12. 
 147. See, e.g., United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries (2001) art. 14. 
 148. Guo shui han [2009] 47, supra note 144. 
 149. Under EIT Law IR, income is effectively connected with an “establishment” if the 
“establishment” “possesses, manages, or controls properties through which income is 
earned.”  EIT Law IR, supra note 12, art. 8.  Since the securities owned by QFIIs are held 
(possessed) by onshore custodians, it is unlikely that such custodians are deemed to be 
establishments but the interest and dividend income is not deemed to be “effectively 
connected.”  
 150. See State Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19 [Provisional Administrative 
Measures on the Tax Administration of Contract Projects and Service Provisions for 
Nonresidents] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Taxation, Jan. 20, 2009, effective Mar. 
1, 2009) [hereinafter State Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19]; Vivian Jiang & 
Koko Tang, China Issues Guidance on Tax Treatment of 'onresidents on Contract Projects, 
2009 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Feb. 24, 2009, at 34–35. 
 151. All labor services are included in the scope of the regulation.  See State 
Administration of Taxation Decree [2009] 19, supra note 150, art. 3.  The same regulation 
2010] “ESTABLISHME'T” I' CHI'ESE TAX 75 
into contracts for the provision of such services,152 and (2) file income tax 
returns on both quarterly and annual bases.153  Although nonresident 
enterprises may claim on their returns that their activities do not constitute 
permanent establishments under relevant treaties and therefore do not 
generate taxable income in China, there appears to be no exemption for the 
return filing requirement.154  
The only circumstance under which the EIT Law requires 
nonresidents to file income tax returns in China is when such nonresidents 
have establishments in China.155  The implicit position of Decree 19, 
therefore, seems to be that any provision of labor service in China—
however transient and regardless of whether a fixed place of business is 
involved, no matter whether it is pursued through dependent or independent 
agents, and no matter whether it is pursued in the course of “production or 
trade”—would give rise to an “establishment” in China.  This implicit 
position is contradictory to the implied position in Circular 47.  Moreover, 
if it can be correctly attributed to the government, it will also amount to a 
fundamental and untenable expansion in the interpretation of 
“establishment.”  This expansion is untenable because it implies that any 
physical presence in China in connection with service provision would 
constitute sufficient business nexus for a foreign entity to be taxed on a net-
income basis in China (absent treaty protection).  Already, at least some 
nonresident enterprises are resisting compliance with Decree 19.156   
As surprising as it may seem that the SAT would adopt measures 
that are at once careless and contradictory, it is equally surprising how few 
tax practitioners in China have voiced criticism of Decree 19 for lacking 
legal authority.157  This silence makes it (painfully) obvious that the 
domestic law concept of “establishment” has been neglected by Chinese tax 
administrators and tax practitioners alike, and that there is a widespread 
failure to recognize that the concept should have some substance of its own, 
independent of the treaty concept of establishment.  
                                                                                                                 
also covered contract projects that nonresident enterprises have entered into (e.g., 
construction, installation, assembly, decoration and exploitation).  
 152. Id. arts. 5–6.  
 153. Id. arts. 12–13.  
 154. Id. art. 13.  
 155. EIT Law, supra note 2, art. 51.  
 156. Interview with Lawrence Sussman, supra note 139. 
 157. For existing commentary on Decree 19, see Jiang & Tang, supra note 150, at 34; 
Peng Tao & Sang Kim, A Brief Examination of Recent Chinese Tax Rules on 'onresident 
Enterprises, TAXES, Dec. 2009, at 39–52. 
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III.  POLICY ISSUES AND THE INTERPRETATION OF “ESTABLISHMENT” 
A. General Tax Policy Toward Inbound Portfolio Investment 
In this Section, I turn to the policy considerations that should guide 
Chinese lawmakers and tax authorities in responding to the issues 
highlighted in the last Section.  The logic of the examination is as follows.  
In connection with a range of transactions either actively carried out today 
or anticipated for the near future, and including, among others, QFII 
activities on Chinese securities markets,158 passive investments in domestic 
investment funds and in real estate, it is reasonable to assume that foreign 
investors would prefer not to be treated as having establishments in 
China.159  There is a range of tax rules that could deliver this result.  
Viewing the question through the lens of U.S. tax law, for instance, one 
could suggest, for a start, a doctrine that treats largely passive investments 
as different in nature from business activities, or, in Chinese terminology, 
from “production or trade.”160  But further, since the perceived benefit of 
inbound portfolio investment is not so much that it supplies additional 
capital to China, as it is that it would introduce sophisticated investors 
whose presence would contribute to capital market development, the 
performance of certain investment-related activities, such as due diligence 
and negotiation, trading, and exercise of investor rights, should be 
anticipated.  Such activities should not trigger adverse tax consequences.  
One could address the concerns that would arise here for, for example, 
QFIIs, by excluding some types of securities trading from “production or 
trade,” analogous to the safe harbor for trading in stocks and securities of 
Code Section 864(b)(2)(A).161  Investments in onshore funds may also 
benefit from such exclusion, depending on the nature of the funds’ 
activities.  
How should one evaluate proposals like this?  Clearly, the question 
is whether introducing such U.S.-style rules is consistent with China’s 
current policy objectives with respect to foreign investment.  Even some 
 
 158. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.  
 159. This is mainly because the lower rates associated with the withholding tax (10% or 
less) generally more than compensate for the lack of deductions when income is taxed on a 
gross basis.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 160. This could be thought of along the lines of U.S. judicial decisions that date back at 
least to Higgins. Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212 (1941).  Such a doctrine would have to 
cope with variations in factual circumstances that could challenge one’s intuition about what 
is passive.  The analog would be the judicial elaboration of the “considerable, continuous 
and regular” standard for “U.S. trade or business.”  See Sicular & Sobol, supra note 13, at 
735–43.  
 161. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A) (2009). 
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preliminary reflection is sufficient to cast doubt on any easy assumption 
that it must be good for China to encourage foreign investment through tax 
rules.  Instead, I will argue that the appropriate design of tax rules depends 
on understanding not only the wider economic context, but also the role tax 
policy plays relative to other regulatory policy.  In particular, one should 
distinguish two conceptions of the role that tax policy might play.  On the 
first conception, tax policy goals regarding foreign investment are set by 
general economic policy goals, and one may simply consider whether tax 
rules would in themselves advance such general goals.  On the second 
conception, tax policy is a subordinate instrument to other regulatory 
policy, and it is only after considering the effects of other regulatory policy 
that one can choose objectives for tax policy.  I will argue below that it is 
the second conception that more realistically characterizes the function of 
Chinese tax policy toward foreign investment.  Interestingly, it is also on 
this second conception that arguments for rules favorable to foreign 
investors can be more cogently advanced.  
1. Assuming Similar Functions for Tax and Regulatory Policies 
One potential model is to introduce U.S.-style rules to Chinese 
inbound taxation.  To consider whether this would be appropriate, it is 
useful briefly to recall the historical origin of some of the current U.S. rules.  
Some fundamental components of current U.S. inbound tax system are the 
result of economic policy decisions that informed both tax and non-tax 
regulatory policies.162  The most important example of this is perhaps the 
Foreign Investors Tax Act (FITA) of 1966.163  In the early 1960s, the U.S. 
faced a substantial balance-of-payment problem.164  Despite a current 
account surplus from exports and significant current earnings on foreign 
investment, large outflows of U.S. investment capital were depleting the 
U.S. gold reserve and threatening the stability of the dollar.165  The 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations offered comprehensive tax and non-
tax policy responses to this situation, both by discouraging, or reducing the 
need for, certain types of outbound investment,166 and by encouraging 
investment into the U.S.167  These responses called for not only steps by the 
 
 162. See Ross, supra note 13, at 288–90.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  With respect to outbound investments, for instance, tax policy responses 
included the enactment of controlled foreign corporation legislation and the interest 
equalization tax.  
 167. The imperative of improving the U.S. gold reserve was indeed so clear that even 
short-term deposits by foreigners in the United States, which “would not reduce the U.S. 
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Treasury and Congress to change tax rules, but also various actions by other 
government agencies as well as “the U.S. financial community” and U.S.-
based international corporations.168  The tax policy proposals that resulted 
in FITA, which abolished the force-of-attraction regime and enacted the 
trading safe harbors of Section 864(b), were accompanied by many other 
policy proposals aimed at inducing foreigners to purchase U.S. securities.169 
Suppose that we conceive the design of Chinese inbound tax rules 
in general, and the interpretation of “establishment” in particular, as aimed 
at affecting foreign investments in a similar comprehensive fashion.170  In 
that case, one would have to note immediately that China’s current 
international investment position is diametrically the opposite of the U.S.’ 
in the early 1960s,171 and there is currently considerable official reservation 
about inbound investments.  In the last few years, China has run a strong 
current account surplus and drawn large amounts of FDI, with the result 
that it now has accumulated the biggest foreign reserve in the world.172  In 
addition to trade and FDI-related inflows, very sizeable amounts of other 
capital inflow are also present, although it has been difficult to identify the 
precise magnitude.173  This additional inflow of capital is viewed by many 
observers to be the result of China’s fixed exchange rate policy and the 
expectation that renminbi will appreciate.174  Although disagreement exists 
as to the extent to which the rapid capital inflows comprise “hot money”—
in no small measure because there is disagreement about what is “hot 
money”175—the economic consequences of the inflow are evident:  China’s 
                                                                                                                 
payments deficit as customarily defined,” were to be encouraged, as they would “reduce the 
volume of liquid dollar assets that foreign central banks might use to buy gold.”  Report to 
the President of the United States From the Task Force on Promoting Increased Foreign 
Investment in United States Corporate Securities and Increased Foreign Financing for 
United States Corporations Operating Abroad, 13 (1964) available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1960/1964_0427_TaskForceForeign.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2010). 
 168. See generally id.  Other government agencies involved included the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve, and the Department of State. 
 169. Id. at 13. 
 170. This would not be completely appropriate.  See infra notes 191–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 184–89 and accompanying text. 
 172. Andrew Batson, China's Reserves Expand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2010, at A-10. 
 173. See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 8–12; Calla Wiemer, The Currency:  A Tisket, 
a Tasket, a Band 'ot a Basket, 9.2 CHINA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY, at 42–46 (2005).  The 
difficulty with identifying other inflows has to do with the uncertain amount of reserve 
increases attributable to appreciation in official asset holdings. 
 174. See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 10, 12. 
 175. The term “hot money” typically refers to speculative flows of capital—particularly 
flows into countries with weak financial markets and institutions—that could potentially 
switch directions within a short time.  See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 10.  
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foreign reserve is more and more likely to exceed the amount of optimal 
reserves, and the indirect addition to the domestic monetary base may 
contribute to inflationary pressure.176  Moreover, it has been suggested that 
absent a currency revaluation, and as long as the domestic savings rate 
continues to exceed the rate of investment, the accumulation of reserves 
will continue.177  An analogy has indeed been drawn between this situation 
and a particular era in U.S. economic history:  not the 1960s with large 
capital outflow and balance of payment problem under the Bretton Woods 
system, but the gilded age of the 1920s.178 
Economists disagree as to whether China should try to change this 
state of affairs by revaluing the renminbi.179  In any case, the Chinese 
government has taken a series of ad hoc measures to mitigate the risk of 
high domestic liquidity and the non-optimality of high reserves.  For 
example, it has loosened capital controls for outbound investments by 
Chinese individuals180 and encouraged Chinese state-owned enterprises to 
invest abroad.181  It has also relaxed requirements for repatriation of profits 
of foreign operations.182  With respect to inbound investments, foreign 
exchange control has been tightened,183 and a cautious approach has been 
 
 176. See Michael Pettis & Logan Wright, Hot Money Poses Risks to China’s Stability, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 13, 2008, at 9. 
 177. See generally Calla Wiemer, Don’t Bet on the Yuan, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW, September 2008, at 23 [hereinafter Don’t Bet on the Yuan]. 
 178. Michael Pettis, Money Matters:  It’s the Banking System, 'ot External Debt, That’s 
Scary, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 2008, at 12. 
 179. China has already allowed the renminbi to float with respect to the dollar within a 
certain expanded range, but some argue that this is insufficient to deter speculative inflow.  
See Andrew Peaple, China Fights Speculative Hordes, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 12, 2010, 
available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704586504574653890470562198.html 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010). For a contrary view, see generally Don’t Bet on the Yuan, supra 
note 177. 
 180. For a helpful overview of China’s foreign currency regime and the capital control 
measures to sustain a fixed exchange rate and large foreign reserves, see Thomas Hall, 
Controlling for Risk:  An Analysis of China’s System of Foreign Exchange and Exchange 
Rate Management, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 433, 464 (2004).  
 181. For a review of recent policies encouraging outbound investment, see Daniel H. 
Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, China’s Changing Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Profile:  
Drivers and Policy Implications, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (June 2009), available at 
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=1245 (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2010).  
 182. Hui fa [2009] 30 [State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Regulations on 
Foreign Exchange Administration of the Overseas Direct Investment of Domestic 
Institutions] (promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Sept. 13, 2009) art.4 
(stating that foreign exchange earned can be kept overseas). 
 183. See Hui zong fa [2008] 142 [Notice Regarding Operational Issues in Enhancing the 
Management of Payment Settlement in Foreign Exchange by Foreign Invested Enterprises] 
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taken particularly with respect to real estate investments.184  These 
developments are best viewed as instinctive reactions by the relevant 
agencies and not as carefully considered new policies.  Nonetheless, they 
represent the complete opposite of U.S. policy toward cross border 
investments in the 1960s, and, as long as the government continues to resist 
appreciation of the renminbi or other fundamental economic undertakings, 
they are likely to persist.  
In light of this background, it would appear that any change in the 
tax system providing new inducements to foreign investment in China is 
unlikely because it would not fit the current, broader official attitude toward 
foreign investment.  In particular, following the American model in 
delineating the boundary between net-income and gross-income taxation 
would seem to produce inconsistencies between tax policy and other 
policies.  This could be said with respect both to the measure of excluding 
activities of trading securities from net-income taxation in the style of Code 
Section 864(b)(2), and the Higgins-style, more conservative and more 
longstanding measure of excluding passive investment holding from net-
income taxation under case law.185  Instead, it seems more consistent for 
China to maintain the status quo, even if that means keeping the 
interpretation of “establishment” in its muddled state.  
However, the foregoing reasoning is based on a conception of tax 
policy as designed to target inbound investment in general, pari passu with 
non-tax regulatory policy.  In reality, regulatory policy toward foreign 
investment has traditionally been dominant in China, whereas tax policy 
occupied a secondary role.  Put differently, the range of transactions that tax 
rules are allowed to affect is antecedently shaped by regulatory policy.  And 
insofar as tax policy and regulatory policy play different roles, they may 
also take on different characters.  
2. Assuming That Tax and Regulatory Polices Have Different 
Functions 
The most important feature of Chinese economic policy toward 
foreign investment is, of course, capital control.186  The country’s capital 
                                                                                                                 
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, Aug. 29, 2008). 
 184. Jian zhu fang [2006] 171 [Opinions on Regulation of Approval and Administration 
of Foreign Investment in the Real Estate Market] (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Commerce, Aug. 14, 2006). 
 185. While excluding trading activities from net-income taxation is not a prevalent 
international practice, excluding passive income is common at least among OECD countries.  
See Ross, supra note 13, at 332. 
 186. See generally Prasad & Wei, supra note 59. 
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account is only partially open, and only a selected group of foreign 
investments are allowed into China.187  As mentioned earlier, FPI (both the 
debt and equity varieties) and foreign loans into China have been and still 
are relatively restricted, with FDI tending to dominate capital inflows.188  
Even FDI is restricted to limited sectors.189  Moreover, once inside China, 
financing options for FDI projects are relatively limited, again partially as a 
result of the policy of capital control and the foreign exchange regulations 
that implement it.190  
In striking contrast with this picture of severe restrictions, 
traditional tax policy toward FDI—which, starting in 2008, is being 
gradually phased out by the new EIT regime—had been extremely 
favorable.191  Approved FDI projects received generous tax incentives and 
tax holidays,192 resulting in much lighter tax burdens than those borne by 
domestically-owned enterprises.193  But it would be a mistake to think that 
these inducements constituted the tax policy embodiment of a general 
favorable economic policy toward foreign investment, forgetting the careful 
selection that foreign investments have to go through.  The tax incentives 
and holidays were available only to FDI of particular types,194 and should 
be thought of as a targeted subsidy, extended to projects that are pre-
selected by non-tax agencies.  Put differently, instead of controlling the 
nature and form of foreign investment, tax policy tried to (positively) affect 
the quantity of such investments. 
To answer these questions, some further methodological issues 
must be clarified.  First, if favorable tax rules were to provide an incentive 
for increased foreign investment, it must be the case that foreign investors 
are in a position to respond to this incentive.  For example, a key aspect in 
the current regulation of foreign investment in Chinese securities markets 
(i.e., the QFII regime) is a quota on the overall volume of such 
investments.195  If the demand for Chinese securities on the part of foreign 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. In addition to the economic policy of capital control, regulatory barriers such as 
lengthy approval processes also raise the cost of foreign investment, leading commentators 
to conclude that “in terms of the overall legal regime, it is not obvious that China makes for 
a particularly attractive FDI destination.”  See Prasad & Wei, supra note 59, at 18-20. 
 191. See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for 
International Tax Debates, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 669, 671–74 (2007). 
 192. See id. at 678–79. 
 193. See id. at 677, 690–91. 
 194. See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
 195. In December, 2007, the overall quota for initial QFII investment was raised from 
$10 billion to $30 billion.  See, inter alia, Hou Lei, China to Expand QFII Quota, CHINA 
DAILY, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-03/07/content_6518464.htm 
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investors is higher than this quota, the quota sets an effective ceiling on the 
volume of investment; more favorable tax treatments would not induce a 
larger volume, and would instead simply offer existing investors a windfall.  
This would not be effective tax policy.  In contrast, if a favorable tax 
treatment is targeted as a threshold issue—foreign investors would invest 
only if a certain treatment is available and would not invest otherwise—
then the justification for the treatment is stronger.  To put it another way, it 
must be specified at what point on the demand curve are tax rules intended 
to affect investor behavior. 
Second, it is important to specify what it means to treat foreign 
investments favorably.  For example, under China’s prior FDI tax regime, 
favorable treatment of FDI meant more than that the effective corporate tax 
rate was lower than in many other countries.196  Instead, resident enterprises 
are divided into two groups:  those that had significant foreign-ownership 
(FIEs, with 25% or more foreign-ownership), and those that had greater 
than 75% domestic ownership.197  FIEs enjoyed better tax treatment from 
lower tax rates, greater use of deductions, and other measures.198  This 
discriminatory treatment—“supra-national” treatment for foreign 
investment199—led to serious distortions, including, most importantly, 
efforts by domestic capital to disguise itself as foreign capital investing in 
China.200  Any proposal for new favorable treatments of foreign 
investments that creates significant risks of this type of distortion, it seems, 
should be avoided.  
These considerations suggest that any novel tax treatment of 
foreign investment needs to be of a type that is neutral between domestic 
                                                                                                                 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2010); Jiang Yuxia, China Triples QFII Quota Ahead of Key Meetings 
with U.S. Officials, CHINA VIEW, Dec. 10, 2007, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/10/content_7226220.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2010). 
 196. Li, supra note 191, at 696. 
 197. See 1991 FEITL, supra note 91, art.2 (defining FIEs as including equity joint 
ventures, cooperative joint ventures, and wholly foreign owned enterprises). 
 198. Li, supra note 191, at 690–91. 
 199. For a brief discussion on the international investment law concept of national 
treatment in China, see Jian Zhou, 'ational Treatment in Foreign Investment Law:  A 
Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective, 10 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 39, 47–48 (2000).  
 200. See Renqing Jin, Minister of Finance, The Necessity and Juncture of Release of the 
Legislation of Enterprise Income Taxation, Address to the National People’s Congress 
before the deliberation of the adoption of the EIT Law, (Mar. 8, 2007), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2007-03/08/content_5816843.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 
2010).  The privileged treatment of FDI contributed to the phenomenon of “roundtripping”:  
domestic capital being moved offshore and reinvested into China.  See also Qinghua Xu & 
A.W. Granwell, Round-Tripping:  The Chinese Approach to Business Restructuring, 15 TAX 
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REPORT No. 8, 320, 320–25 (2006). 
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and foreign investors.201  It should also focus on threshold issues facing 
foreign investors—removing obstacles that would otherwise prevent 
foreign investment—instead of offering windfalls.  Interestingly, these 
simple guidelines are in fact quite useful in resolving some vexing issues 
confronting Chinese tax authorities and taxpayers today, for example, how 
to interpret “establishment” in the context of investments in Chinese 
partnerships and partnership-like entities.  I now turn to that question as an 
illustration of how the principle of equal treatment of foreign- and 
domestically-owned investments must be applied in actual rule design. 
B. Interpretation of “Establishment” for Investment in Partnerships 
1. Symmetry Between Foreign- and Domestically-Invested 
Partnerships 
Many countries and subnational jurisdictions have had to consider 
the following question:  Does holding a general or limited partnership 
interest in a partnership conducting business in jurisdiction X cause a 
foreign partner to have a business nexus to X, such that the foreign partner 
is subject to net-income taxation of by X on the partner’s share of income 
derived from the activities of the partnership in X?  
Generally, being a foreign shareholder of a corporation formed in X 
does not create a business nexus with X for the shareholder; nor would 
being a creditor of the corporation, unless perhaps the credit were extended 
to a borrower in the business of lending.202  More modern limited 
partnership laws provide that limited partners have little or no control over 
the conduct of a partnership’s business, such that limited partners have no 
more control than shareholders have over corporations they own, or 
creditors have over their debtors.203  It is typical, for instance, that 
management of the partnership is wholly delegated to one or more general 
partners.204  It seems logical, then, that a limited partner interest should no 
 
 201. It may be worth noting that the recommendation of neutrality here is made in order 
to prevent manipulation, and not on the basis of a general attempt to equalize the tax 
competitiveness of foreign and domestic investors.  The competitive advantage foreign 
investors enjoy relative to domestic investors depends on not only source country but also 
resident country taxation.  See generally Michael Knoll, Taxation and the Competitiveness of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth Funds to Invest in the 
United States?, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703 (2009). 
 202. See OECD Model Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(7).  
 203. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON 
PARTNERSHIP §§ 12–18, 32 (Aspen Publishers 27th ed. 2009).  
 204. Id.  
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more result in a business nexus than a shareholder’s or creditor’s interest.205 
Many jurisdictions, however, have disregarded this logic about 
limited partners.  For instance, Section 875 of the U.S. tax code provides 
that “a nonresident alien individual or foreign corporation shall be 
considered as being engaged in a trade or business within the United States 
if the partnership of which such individual or corporation is a member is so 
engaged.”206  This rule is understood to apply to both general and limited 
partners.207  When the predecessor of Section 875 was enacted in 1936,208 
the use of limited partnerships (particularly by foreigners) was not as 
prevalent as it would become subsequently, and case law from which the 
Section was extracted largely concerned general partnerships.209  In the 
context of general partnerships, the attribution of partnership activities to its 
partners followed from the view of the partnership as a mere aggregate of 
its partners and not a separate entity.210  However, under limited partnership 
statutes of the various U.S. states, attributing assets and activities of a 
partnership to the partners would be incorrect for non-tax purposes.211  
From this perspective, the application of Section 875 to limited partnerships 
seems inappropriate.212 
One suggestion for a defense of Section 875 may be that the 
 
 205. Some U.S. states take this view and exempt limited partners of partnerships 
operating in the states from return-filing obligations.  See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-4-
806(a), 67-4-903(a); see also Tenn. Dep’t of Rev. Ltr. Rul. 97-49 (Dec. 2, 1997), available 
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 210. W.C. Johnston, 24 T.C. at 922–23. 
 211. See Wroblewski v. Brucher, 550 F.Supp. 742 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Evans v. Galardi, 
546 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1976); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 203, at §§1.03, 11.03 and 
14.02.  
 212. The issue of whether a limited partnership interest creates a business nexus has 
been contested in another area of U.S. inbound taxation:  the determination of whether such 
an interest constitutes a permanent “establishment” under income tax treaties.  See Donroy, 
Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962); Robert Unger, T.C. Memo 1990-15, 
aff’d, Unger v. Comm’r, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  
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structure of tax rules should not be made to depend on the vagaries of 
partnership law over time and across jurisdictions:  what a limited partner 
does and is entitled to do could vary greatly under different partnership 
laws and specific partnership agreements.  But a stronger defense is in fact 
available.  The justification for the broad partnership-to-partner attribution 
rule of Section 875 probably does not lie in any particular interpretation of 
partnership law.  Instead, it could be seen as necessary to maintain one set 
of partnership rules for both foreign-invested and domestically-owned 
partnerships, and, by the same token, equal treatment of domestic and 
foreign partners.  This may be illustrated by reference to U.S. tax law, but 
the basic point is generally applicable. 
Suppose, for instance, that a U.S. partnership is engaged in a trade 
or business, but that foreign limited partners in the partnership are, contrary 
to Section 875, not deemed to be so engaged.  Assuming that the foreign 
partners do not otherwise engage in a U.S. trade or business, none of their 
income derived from the partnership would then be treatable as effectively 
connected with a U.S. trade or business.  This would make it very difficult 
to implement the flow-through approach that generally characterizes federal 
income taxation of partnerships and partners.  First and foremost, there 
would be no basis for allocating expenses to the foreign partners, since they 
would be taxed only on a gross-income basis.  Second, it would no longer 
make sense to allow the character of many types of income (e.g., operating 
income, Section 1231 gain) to pass through to the partners.  However, if the 
character of any item of income received by a foreign partner were 
indeterminate, its source and applicable tax rate would also become 
indeterminate.  In other words, treating income of a partnership as received 
in the course of a trade or business, while treating the same income, when 
allocated or distributed to foreign partners, as not received in the course of a 
trade or business, would render flow-through taxation of partnerships 
incoherent.213  
It is conceivable, of course, to tax foreign partners on partnership 
income other than on a flow-through basis.  Foreign partners could be 
subject to tax only on net income derived from a partnership, and a single 
tax rate could be applied to such income depending on whether the foreign 
partner is an individual or a corporation.  This would be similar to how U.S. 
partnerships now compute Section 1446 withholding on effectively 
connected income allocated or distributed to foreign partners.214  
 
 213. For an overview of the flow-through approach to partnership taxation adopted by 
U.S. federal income tax law, see LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE 
LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K:  A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS (West 
3d ed. 2006). 
 214. I.R.C. § 1446 (2009). 
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Simplifying even further, a single tax rate may be applied to any net income 
allocated or distributed to foreign partners, regardless of whether they are 
individuals or corporations.  This would basically implement a business 
profits tax for foreign partners, its chief difference from a corporate income 
tax being that investors are not taxed on distributions from the business’s 
after-tax profits.  
These ways of taxing foreign partners are not only theoretically 
possible, but are in fact practiced in some jurisdictions (including some 
U.S. states).215  The crucial point is that they diverge from the flow-through 
(or aggregate) approach to partnership taxation that the federal income tax 
generally follows.  If these non-flow-through approaches are followed, 
partners’ individual tax profiles will no longer determine the ultimate tax 
liability on income derived from a partnership.  This could be unfavorable 
to foreign partners in some circumstances and would likely trigger a charge 
that the rule violated the non-discrimination article found in most income 
tax treaties.216  In other circumstances, computing tax on income derived 
from a partnership on a self-standing basis could be favorable to foreign 
partners, but this means that the foreign limited partners could receive 
better treatment than domestic limited partners who are still subject to flow-
through taxation.  
In summary, abandoning the partnership-to-partner attribution rule 
of Section 875 for foreign limited partners would be inconsistent with flow-
through taxation of foreign partners, and if flow-through taxation continued 
to be practiced at all, there would be a discrepancy in the treatment of 
foreign and domestic partners.217  Therefore, in any jurisdiction in which a 
 
 215. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 216. See OECD Model Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(3) (“The taxation on a 
permanent ‘establishment’ which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other 
Contracting State shall not be less favorably levied in that other State than the taxation 
levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities.”).  
 217. I am not aware of such a defense of I.R.C. § 875 having been offered elsewhere, 
although in one important case, the U.S. Tax Court made an argument that could be 
interpreted along these lines.  In Unger, supra note 212, the Tax Court defended the Donroy 
doctrine of attributing the permanent “establishment” of a partnership to a foreign limited 
partner, even while acknowledging that such an attribution would not be justifiable on the 
basis of partnership law alone.  In particular, the court stated:   
[T]he tax on a partnership’s income and gains is applied at the individual partner level 
through the use of the aggregate theory . . . [The] characterization of a partnership as being 
merely an association of individuals, for purposes of determining the actual tax to be 
imposed on a partnership’s . . . profits, is perhaps the most important characteristic of a 
partnership for Federal income tax purposes . . . Because the actual taxation of a partnership 
is achieved through the aggregate theory of partnership, we hold the aggregate theory of 
partnership to also be applicable when determining whether a partner has a “permanent 
establishment” in the United States . . . regardless of whether the partner is a limited or 
general partner. 
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flow-through, aggregate approach to partnership taxation is taken, if 
inbound transactions are also taxed in such a way that business nexus, 
however labeled, leads to net-income basis taxation, then partnership-to-
partner attribution of business activities of the kind Code Section 875 
exemplifies should also be observed.  
2. Implication for Partnership Funds in China 
China’s previous partnership tax rules cannot easily be categorized 
as taking the flow-through approach.218  Nonetheless, tax rules that would 
apply to partnerships formed under the newly revised Partnership 
Enterprise Law are still being designed, and there is very strong interest on 
the part of both domestic and foreign investors in seeing that flow-through 
taxation is adopted so that the character of investment income received by a 
partnership is preserved when distributed to partners.219  However, if 
foreign investors are granted flow-through taxation, they would, by the 
logic of the preceding discussion, have to confront the partnership-to-
partner attribution of establishments (or permanent establishments, if a 
treaty is applicable).  As we have seen in Section II.B, the issue of 
attribution of an “establishment” from an investment fund to the fund’s 
investors also arises in connection with a partnership-like form, the non-
legal person CJV.  
A recap of the policy considerations in this Section shows clearly 
the predicament facing foreign investors in Chinese funds.  Such investors 
will be found to have an “establishment” in China if they engage in 
“production or trade” through a fixed place of business or through agents.  
Chinese tax law has not excluded acts of purchasing, holding and selling 
securities and other assets from the definition of “production or trade,” let 
alone acts of trading securities and managing underlying companies.  And it 
is unlikely that such a narrowing of the definitions of “production or trade” 
would be offered in the near future as a general inducement for the inflow 
of foreign investments.  Insofar as the activities of an investment 
partnership might constitute “production or trade,” such a characterization 
would also likely be applied to its general and limited partners, resulting in 
                                                                                                                 
Robert Unger, T.C. Memo 1990-15, at 90-58.  
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and capital gain is taxed at a lower rate than other types of income from partnerships.  
Domestic corporate partners may also benefit from flow-through treatment because of the 
inter-corporate dividend exemption, and for other reasons as well.  
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net-income basis taxation of income derived from the partnership—
generally an unacceptable consequence for foreign passive investors.220  
This analysis also makes clear what a concession to foreign 
investors in onshore partnership funds might be.  What is at stake is a 
threshold issue:  if an interest in a Chinese fund is considered an 
“establishment” that would subject the owner to net taxation in China, most 
foreign investors would not acquire such interests.  If the government wants 
to encourage foreign acquisition of partnership interests in Chinese funds, 
the interpretation of “establishment” will have to be selectively relaxed.  
One approach is to designate some fund activities (e.g., performing due 
diligence on, negotiating for the purchase of, purchasing, holding and 
selling securities) as falling outside the scope of “production or trade.”  In 
addition, for other activities (e.g., providing consulting and other services to 
portfolio companies) that could not be easily excluded from the scope of 
“production or trade,” if such activities are performed by other parties (e.g., 
a separate investment manager) neither at the direction of nor for the benefit 
of the partnership, then the government could also agree that they do not 
lead foreign partners in a fund to have establishments in China.  This would 
be a continuation of the approach taken in the 2003 VC Tax Rules, as 
discussed in Section II.B above.221  Such targeted relaxations would be 
more easy to adopt than a more liberal general interpretation of 
“establishment.”  Finally, to the extent that similar rules are adopted for 
domestic investors in the funds as well (e.g., flow-through taxation, certain 
income treated as passive investment income and not active operating 
income), they would also not lead to any meaningful discrepancy between 
the treatment of resident and non-resident investors.  
While this approach appears both practical and justifiable on a 
number of policy grounds, the analysis it is based on is only preliminary 
and can no doubt be further refined.  What is important to note, however, is 
that unless a new discourse emerges in China among taxpayers, tax 
practitioners and administrators as well as policymakers concerning tax 
policy toward inbound investment and basic legal concepts such as 
establishment, there can be no expectation that the government will tackle 
 
 220. For a foreign corporate investor (which generally is the relevant case in the Chinese 
context; see supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text), the effect of taxation on a net basis 
instead of a gross basis is roughly as follows:  (1) the applicable tax rate would be 25% 
instead of 10%, with this rate difference being offset to some extent by the deductibility of 
certain expenses; and (2) where a treaty applies, a gain on sale that might otherwise have 
been exempted under the capital gain article in the treaty will become a normal taxable item 
under the business profits article.  
 221. It would also be similar to the practice of bifurcating the general partner and 
investment manager entities in U.S. fund practice.  See ANDREW W. NEEDHAM & ANITA 
BETH ADAMS, Private Equity Funds, B.N.A. TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 735 at A-18 (2005). 
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the issues we have discussed in any fashion like what we have done here.  
Generally, this is because tax authorities are guided chiefly by the goal of 
revenue preservation, and taxpayers by the goal of minimizing tax, and 
these conflicting goals cannot be resolved without policy and legal norms 
that show what is reasonable.  More specifically, the determination that 
some activities might constitute production or trade while others do not is 
exactly something that the government has largely avoided doing so far in 
the evolution of the concept of establishment, as shown in our previous 
discussion.222  Taxpayers’ acquiescence in this practice has arguably 
resulted in a general view that there are no norms in this area.223  But 
clearly, it cannot be the case such determination is required only in the 
investment fund area and not in others.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has aimed to identify and analyze some of the basic 
concepts, principles, and policy considerations that underlie and unify a 
number of seemingly disparate and very practical issues in Chinese taxation 
today, such as the tax treatment of onshore investment funds, foreign 
investment in real estate, and QFIIs.  It does so first by highlighting some 
fundamental trends that are likely to lead to paradigmatic changes in 
Chinese inbound taxation.  These trends include a gradual but definite shift 
to a more balanced mix of inbound direct and portfolio investment, as well 
as a breach in the traditional bias against the deployment of noncorporate 
business forms.  In addition to identifying the directions in which Chinese 
inbound taxation is likely to evolve, we have approached the legal issues 
involved by taking seriously the Chinese tax law concept of establishment.  
This has meant two things.  One is to examine systematically the concept’s 
use under existing law.  The other is to evaluate this use, and its possible 
augmentation, not primarily in light of “international norms” or concepts 
playing similar roles in other countries’ tax systems, but in the first place in 
light of the tax and regulatory policies China may adopt in its own unique 
circumstances.  
We have largely stayed away from the treaty concept of permanent 
establishment, or that concept’s interpretation by Chinese authorities.  
Although a comparison between the domestic law and the treaty concept is 
no doubt useful, it is important to recognize, as a fundamental matter, that 
the domestic law concept may well follow its own logic.  It is not 
 
 222. The main exception to this is Guo shui fa [1996] 212 and related local government 
circulars.  See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
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uncommon for practitioners of international taxation to speak, particularly 
in connection with jurisdictions not their own, of “permanent 
establishment” even when they are discussing whether, under the domestic 
tax law of a host country, particular items of income may be subject to net 
basis taxation, and even when it cannot be assumed that a treaty is 
applicable.  The risk of being subject to net-income taxation and return 
filing obligations is sometimes referred to as “PE risk.”  While this blurring 
of domestic law concepts with the treaty concept may often serve as 
convenient shorthand, it may also imply an assumption that there is one 
international norm for designing two-tiered tax systems for inbound 
investment and that countries merely differ in the details in implementing 
this norm.  We have not made that assumption here, and our findings have 
shown that dispensing with such an assumption facilitates the 
comprehension and analysis of the issues domestic taxing authorities face. 
